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 Since its inception, the global community has been marred by insecurities about the 
intentions of other states, which led to states creating intelligence agencies to engage in human 
intelligence operations. In defense against foreign intelligence services, the U.S. has 
implemented policies and procedures, informed by defection research, to prevent and detect 
defection. However, this leads to the question does current research on motivation for defection 
adequately inform government policies and procedures to prevent and detect defection within the 
intelligence community? To interrogate this question, I present an in-depth analysis of 
motivation; the ways in which these conclusions have or have not been applied in defection 
studies; and current ways the government prevents and detects defection. Utilizing an 
understanding of these components, I present five case studies that demonstrate defection studies 
failure are unable to explain motivation, absent the incorporation of theoretical assistance from 
psychologists, sociologists, or social psychologists. In concluding, I assess that those studying 
motivation for defection within the intelligence community have not been studying motivation 
for defection, but ways in which to assist intelligence officers in eliciting defection from an 
individual. This focus, while advantageous for the intelligence community, fails to adequately 
inform the U.S. government in support their prevention and detection of defection. Faced with 
	
this failure, I bring forward two proposals that would enhance the government’s understanding of 
motivation for defection and the development of effective policies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the establishment of the modern “state” there has been significant theoretical 
discussion about the implications and potential for interstate conflict and cooperation. 
Disagreements among scholars and practitioners within international relations have led to a 
variety of theories that range from the belief that war is omnipresent to the belief in the potential 
for a utopian global government; however, one consistent theme throughout all theories is 
uncertainty.1 A few examples include the uncertainty of whether a state will act in their own 
interest, the global good, or a combination of both; the military capabilities of another; or the 
political, economic, or military intentions of an opposition. These uncertainties have led states to 
seek out ways to better understand its competitors, leading to the establishment of intelligence 
agencies. In the United States (U.S.), the intelligence community (a general term for the 
collection of U.S. intelligence agencies) has been tasked with the collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of information about other states, with other states also establishing similar 
intelligence structures. As Chapter 2 further explains, these intelligence agencies play an 
indispensable role in national and international security. 
While states make up the structure of the international community, states are made of 
institutions, and these institutions are composed of people. The following paper looks at this 
most fundamental component of a state, the person. In focusing on the individual, the following 
paper evaluates a fundamental aspect of human intelligence (HUMINT), any intelligence that is 
																																																								
1 Paul Williams and Matt McDonald, “An Introduction to Security Studies,” in Security Studies: 
An Introduction, ed. Paul Williams and Matt McDonald (New York: Routledge, 2018), 1-14.  
   2 
received from a person,2 defection. Defection, the act of an individual giving classified 
information to another government, poses a significant risk to national security. To defend 
against this, governments have turned to their respective intelligence communities to establish 
and implement policies that are informed by research, leading the following paper to attempt to 
answer the question of does current research on motivation for defection adequately inform 
government procedures to prevent and detect defection within the intelligence community? 
To answer this question, this paper focuses on understanding the development of 
motivational theory; the failure of those applying motivational studies to defection research; and 
the way in which research focusing on defection has informed (or failed to inform) government 
procedures to prevent and detect defection. To do this, I first demonstrate the indispensable role 
that intelligence agencies play in promoting national and international security; that without 
HUMINT, states would fail to truly understand the intentions of other states; and that an 
understanding of motivation and defection are imperative in collecting HUMINT. In Chapter 3, I 
discuss the theoretical frameworks that have shaped an academic understanding of motivation; 
the work of practitioners focusing on defection within the intelligence community; and current 
governmental efforts at preventing and detecting defection within the intelligence community. In 
Chapter 4, I demonstrate the viability of the conclusions of the theoretical and applied research 
by evaluating five case studies. In evaluating these case studies, I also look at how the 
government’s understanding of motivation and the procedures failed (or succeeded) in 
preventing and/or detecting defection. Chapter 5 goes on to assess that research focusing on 
																																																								
2 Central Intelligence Agency, “INTelligence: Human Intelligence,” News & Information, last 
modified April 30, 2013, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-
featured-story-archive/intelligence-human-intelligence.html. 
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applying motivational research to defection has failed to actually investigate motivation, thus 
leading to uninformed government procedures.  
In closing, I conclude that those applying motivation theory to defection fail to address 
the motivation of an individual, instead focusing on ways to leverage superficial “symptoms” of 
motivation as a tool to be exploited by intelligence officers. I also postulate that this failure has 
inadequately informed the government about ways to prevent and detect defection. In taking this 
approach, this paper sets out to establish ways to better study motivation for defection, further 
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CHAPTER 2 
REASONS FOR STUDY 
To adequately create a case for the studying of intelligence agencies, the following 
chapter is broken down into four sections, the first two sections discuss National and 
International Security, focusing on the defined threats within the given spheres and the role that 
the intelligence community plays in mitigating those threats in their support of promoting 
national and international security. The third section, HUMINT Sources, focuses on a particular 
type of intelligence source, the benefits of accessing this type of intelligence source, and the 
continued prevalence that HUMINT will play in the future. The final section of this chapter, 
Study of Motivation for Defection, discusses the act of a HUMINT source turning from their 
country to a foreign adversary, leading to the view that it is imperative to fully understand 
defection and the contributing factors, leading to effectively development procedures to prevent 
and detect it.  
 
National Security 
When looking to interstate relations, one component must be present for a state to persist 
in the international community, survival. There is a pervasive argument within international 
studies to the ways in which a state can ensure its survival, posing questions such as, “Can states 
cooperate to promote a collective security?” and “To what degree does relative power play in a 
state’s decision-making process?” However, one observation is evident, if the state does not 
exist, we are unable to talk about the state and its functions. Therefore, the following section 
takes a look at the various threats to a state’s national security and how intelligence, and the 
intelligence community as a whole, promotes national security. 
   5 
The United States (U.S.), through diplomatic, international trade agreements, economic 
advantage, and military force has become a world super power and comes with the consequence 
of being exposed to numerous threats as noted in Robert Kagan’s “Power and Weakness”. He 
claims that through the predominance as a military force, the U.S. has positioned itself to be 
threatened by a variety of actors around the world.3 These threats include competing interests 
with rival states; numerous terrorist threats and organizations, both domestic and international; 
and the potential for cyber-attacks on the U.S. These threats are outlined in depth in the National 
Security Strategy (NSS),4 a document released by the President of the United States since 1987 
outlining the most prevalent security threats around the world to U.S. national security. 
However, even prior to development of the NSS, the U.S. faced national and international 
threats, leading to the development and refining of seventeen intelligence agencies.5 These 
agencies have a variety of jobs including, but not limited to: collecting and analyzing 
information from publicly available information (Open Source Intelligence); gathering and 
analyzing data on physical structures around the world determining their function and purpose 
(Geospatial Intelligence);6 and gathering information about the structure, military capabilities, or 
other information about another country through human sources via covert collection 
(HUMINT).7 In executing their responsibilities, the U.S intelligence agencies “defend against 
																																																								
3 Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review, no. 113 (June & July 2002): 3-28. 
4 Donald Trump, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” (Washington 
DC: Government Printing Office, 2017). 
5 Nina, Agrawal, “There's more than the CIA and FBI: The 17 agencies that make up the U.S. 
intelligence community,” L.A. Times, Sept. 16, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-17-
intelligence-agencies-20170112-story.html. 
6 National Geospatial Agency, “About the NGA,” accessed September 16, 2017, 
https://www.nga.mil/About/Pages/Default.aspx. 
7 Central Intelligence Agency, “Human Intelligence,” Offices of CIA, last modified August 03, 
2016, https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/clandestine-service/intelligence.html. 
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and mitigate threat actors operating below the threshold of open conflict” through the collection 
and defense of national and international secrets and to provide the President, U.S. policymakers, 
and other consumers (decision makers within the government) timely and accurate intelligence to 
allow them to make effective decisions.8 The following section looks at the role that U.S. 
intelligence agencies play in defending the U.S. from the competing interests with rival states 
and against domestic and international terrorist threats.  
Competing Interests with Rival States 
As outlined in the 2017 NSS, one predominant threat that the U.S. faces is competing 
state interests, which include but are not limited to the security of the state against weapon 
systems and military force of a competitor and the knowledge of current and future operations of 
the opponent to disrupt the rival’s economic or political situation. 9  While there are other 
interests of the state as defined by other political scientists and theorists, a focus on these threats 
demonstrate the prevalence and importance that the intelligence agencies have played in assisting 
the U.S. in defending its national security.  
One primary aspect of interstate competition focuses on weapon capability inequality. 
Within this realm, there are numerous instances in which intelligence has played a vital role in 
providing policy makers with objective information to better inform their decisions. One such 
instance is revealed in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, where the U.S. determined that the 
Soviet Union (USSR) moved nuclear missiles to Cuba during the Cold War. At the time these 
missiles posed a threat because the U.S. perceived that these missiles had were more capable 
																																																								
8 Trump, “National Security Strategy,” 2017; and Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA Vision, 
Mission, Ethos & Challenges,” About the CIA, last modified March 24, 2016, 
https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/cia-vision-mission-values; Defense Intelligence Agency, “About 
the DIA,” Accessed October 7, 2018, http://www.dia.mil/About/. 
9 Kenneth Waltz, Man the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). 
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than the U.S.’ This misperception has become known as the “missile gap”. To avert a potentially 
volatile situation, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) effectively ran Oleg Penkovsky as an 
informant, an intelligence asset who relayed information about the USSR missile operating 
systems,10 allowing President Kennedy to make an informed decision on how to progress to 
diffuse the situation. A second way in which intelligence agencies contribute to national security 
is through the evaluation of military force and capabilities of a rival state. One key example that 
shows the prevalence of the intelligence community’s work is in the case of Dmitri Polyakov. As 
a GRU colonel, Polyakov fed the CIA information on Chinese and Vietnamese forces, giving the 
U.S. access to classified information on the enemy forces and their movements.11 While his work 
did not necessarily reveal inequalities within the battlefield, it allowed the U.S. an advantage by 
knowing that the Chinese and Vietnamese troops had the ability to muster against U.S. troops.  
A second concern that rival states pose to national security could be categorized as 
economic or political threats. One example of an economic threat, discussed by John Brockmiller 
in his article “Psywar in Intelligence Operations,” depicts the advantage that a state would have 
if they recognize a shift in the economy of their rival from the development of military 
equipment to that of consumer goods.12 In this scenario, a rival country, with this information, 
would be able to have a more holistic picture of the other’s actions and would be able to adjust 
one’s policy to readily be able to counter the new economic market that would be emerging as a 
result of the production shift. Intelligence agencies also play a critical role in identifying, 
																																																								
10 Norman Polmar, and Thomas Allen, Spy Book: the Encyclopedia of espionage (New York: 
Random House, Inc., 1997).  
11 Richard Trahair and Robert Miller, Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret 
Operations (Enigma Books, 2012). 
12 John Brockmiller. “Psywar in Intelligence Operations,” Studies of Intelligence 5, no. 3 (Sept. 
1961): 49-55. 
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addressing, and responding to political threats from a rival state. A prime example is in their 
involvement in the case of the Russian disinformation campaign during the 2016 U.S. 
Presidential Election. The U.S. intelligence community gathered and evaluated evidence 
surrounding the claims of Russian involvement; contributed to the educating of policy makers on 
the conclusions of the investigation; their investigation and interaction with policy makers 
directly contributed to the implementation of sanctions against Russia.13 While this is a more 
immediate example of intelligence agencies’ involvement in political defense of U.S. national 
security, it shows the attempts of rival states to influence domestic affairs of the U.S.  
Detection and Protection Against Terrorist Threats 
 In another prominent component in the 2017 NSS, the president identified the use of 
intelligence sources to continue to successfully rout out domestic and international terrorists.14 
While terrorism has remained a contested definition within the security field, the U.S. Patriot Act 
defines domestic terrorism as “an attempt to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a 
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”15 In concurrence with the vision 
of the NSS, the Director of National Intelligence, Daniel Coats, in “The Worldwide Threat 
Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” deems homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) 
																																																								
13 Karen Yourish and Troy Griggs, “8 U.S. Intelligence Groups Blame Russia for Meddling, but 
Trump Keeps Clouding the Picture,” The New York Times, August 2, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/07/16/us/elections/russian-interference-statements-
comments.html; Conor Finnegan, Jordyn Phelps, and Arlette Saenz, “Trump administration 
sanctions Russians for 2016 election interference, other cyber attacks,” ABC News, March 15, 
2018, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-administration-sanctions-russia-2016-election-
interference-cyber/story?id=53768648. 
14 Trump, National Security Strategy,” 2017.  
15 Greg Myre, “What Is, And Isn’t, Considered Domestic Terrorism,” NPR, October 2, 2017, 
https://www.npr.org/2017/10/02/555170250/what-is-and-isnt-considered-domestic-terrorism.  
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as the primary domestic terrorist threat to national security.16 These are individuals that are 
influenced by, and sometimes aided by, foreign extremist organizations to carry out attacks on 
U.S. soil. One recently declassified case of combatting HVE’s is the British Secret Intelligence 
Service’s (MI6) running of a HUMINT source inside al-Qaeda (AQ). In the book Nine Lives: My 
time as the West’s top spy inside al-Qaeda, Aimen Dean describes his life inside AQ as an 
informant for MI6, where he spent a majority of his time passing information on AQ’s attempts 
to influence nationals to carry out attacks on British and American soil.17 Dean’s account of his 
support for MI6 and the U.S. intelligence community demonstrates that the vital intelligence that 
he provided to his handlers prevented what would have been a number of successful terrorist 
attacks targeting the UK.  
 The previous section focused on two primary threats to national security: 1) competing 
interests of rival states and 2) the detection and prevention of terrorist threats, providing 
examples of a variety of cases and operations involving intelligence agencies and the impact that 
those cases and operations have had in promoting national security. It also demonstrated that 
without the use of intelligence in the promotion of national security, policy makers would be 





16 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record, The Worldwide 
Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, by Daniel Coats, (2018), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-
SSCI.pdf. 
17 Aimen Dean, Paul Cruickshank, and Tim Lister, Nine Lives: My time as the West’s top spy 
inside al-Qaeda (Oneworld Publications, 2018). 
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International Security 
As previously iterated, without an international community there would be no structure 
for states to interact in, which could lead to multiple outcomes. Therefore, maintaining this 
structure is critical to international security. This paper defines international security as “the 
preservation of the norms, rules, institutions, and value of international society” to distinguish 
international security from national security. 18  Looking at international security through Samuel 
Makinda’s definition allows me to use a broad brush when looking into the impact of 
intelligence activities on international security, while limiting the operationalizing of 
international security to situations (or actors) that would compromise the foundational integrity 
of global society as a whole.19 However, Bill McSweeney, in Security, Identity and Interests: A 
Sociology of International Relations, identifies an increased interconnectivity of the security 
interests of states and the difficulty to address one absent consideration for the security interests 
of others.20 This therefore leads to the observation that states classify differing situations or 
actors as threats,21 a conversation beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I will focus on the 
																																																								
18Samuel Makinda, “Sovereignty and Global Security,” Sage Journals 29, no. 3 (September 
1998): 281-292. 
19 Alicia Sanders-Zakre, “Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2018,” Arms 
Control Association, last modified August 17, 2018, 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity; 
UNHCR, “Syria Emergency,” Emergencies, accessed October 20, 2018, 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/syria-emergency.html.  
20 Bill McSweeny, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations 
(Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
21 Ted Hopf, “The logic of habit in International Relations,” European Journal of International 
Relations 16, no. 4 (December 2010): 539-561; Richard Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” 
International Organization 38, no. 2 (Spring 1984): 225-286; and Kagan, “Power and 
Weakness,” 2002. 
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ways in which intelligence agencies defend against military challenges and terrorism in the 
promotion of international security.22 
 One of the most innate threat to one’s security is a physical threat, where, to a state in the 
international community, the most obvious is another’s military. A primary example of 
intelligence agencies’ role in protecting against military challenges is exemplified in the Cold 
War. Unlike WW2 and the Gulf War, the intelligence activities run by the CIA against the USSR 
were constant and diverse. The CIA used, as mentioned before, Oleg Penkovsky to gather 
intelligence on USSR missile capabilities;23 the U-2 plane to gather imagery on USSR troop 
movements;24 and numerous other HUMINT and SIGINT operations to gather extensive 
knowledge on USSR capabilities and movement. In assessing the USSR military forces, 
capabilities, and movements, the U.S. assisted the international community by protecting it from 
the USSR (and ultimately Communism). While this was an example of how intelligence agencies 
were successful in increasing international security, there are times in history that we have seen 
times were intelligence activity has led to the destabilization of the international community. Due 
to the inaccurate assessment of the CIA, regarding Iraq’s weapon of mass destruction (WMD) 
capability, 25  the U.S. led a coalition effort to invade Iraq, spurring a war, and occupation lasting 
until 2011.26 Both of these examples, one of successful intelligence operations, the other an 
																																																								
22 Vasantha Raghavan, "Challenges to Global Security," Pakistan Horizon 60, no. 3 (July 2007): 
23-39; and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, The Worldwide Threat Assessment of 
the US Intelligence Community, 2018. 
23 Polmar and Allen, Spy Book: the Encyclopedia of espionage, 1997.  
24 CIA, “Aerial Reconnaissance,” 2012.  
25 CIA, “INTelligence: Human Intelligence.” 
26 “The Iraq War,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed October 24, 2018, 
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war. 
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intelligence blunder, demonstrate the profound implications that intelligence intervention has on 
international security. 
 Terrorism is a potent threat that is not constrained by borders and has shown to threaten 
both poor and wealthy stats alike. Looking at international terrorism, defined as violent acts that 
would violate the code of a state that are intended to influence civilians, government policy, or 
the conduct of the government primarily outside the jurisdiction of the U.S.,27 demonstrates 
intelligence agencies’ ability to respond to perceived crises. The 9/11 terrorist attacks were one 
of these crises that shook the U.S. and international community. It was a primary catalyst in 
increasing intelligence agencies’ counterterrorism ability and drastic legislative and executive 
actions by the U.S., resulting in: the U.S. PATRIOT Act, which increased communication ability 
between intelligence organizations;28 the creation of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS)29 and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI),30 fundamental components 
in defending, preventing, and responding to security threats; and an increase in funding for the 
U.S. intelligence community.31 With its newly increased capabilities, the U.S. intelligence 
community has led the Global War on Terror, conducting missions such as arming Syrian rebels 
																																																								
27 Cornell Law School, “18 U.S. Code §- Definitions,” U.S. Code, accessed October 27, 2018, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2331. 
28 Department of Justice, “The USA PATRIOT Act: Preserving Life and Liberty,” Highlights of 
the USA PATRIOT Act, accessed October 27, 2018, 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm. 
29 Department of Homeland Security, “History,” About DHS, accessed October 27, 2018, 
https://www.dhs.gov/history. 
30 Gordon Lederman, “Restructuring the Intelligence Community,” Hoover Press, accessed 
October 27, 2018, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/0817946624_65.pdf. 
31 Congressional Research Service, Intelligence Community Spending: Trends and Issues, by 
Micael DeVine, R44381 (2018).  
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to fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) (an international terrorist 
organization, denying them a safe haven for their organization.32   
By looking at intelligence agencies’ support for international security in countering 
military challenges and terrorism, I have demonstrated their role as a guarantee of the 
international community; their ability to address their customer’s needs (policy makers); and 
their capacity to meet the world’s security demands.  
 
Human Intelligence Sources  
The U.S., in their pursuit of intelligence, uses a variety of sources, such as SIGINT, 
HUMINT, geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), and open source collection. However, one primary 
type of source that has a profound impact on intelligence gathering is a HUMINT source. 
HUMINT is any information that comes from a human source (intelligence agents), such as a 
scientist or foreign intelligence agency employee (intelligence officer).33 When looking at the 
previous operations and the role that intelligence, specifically HUMINT, has played in mitigating 
threats to national and international security it is vital to evaluate the specific function that it 
currently holds within intelligence organizations, as well as its future in intelligence 
communities. The three primary components of HUMINT addressed in the following section are 
the actors involved, the way in which HUMINT is moved from a source to an intelligence 
agency, and HUMINT’s current and future roles within the intelligence community. 
 
																																																								
32 John Walcott, “Trump ends CIA arms support for anti-Assad Syria rebels: U.S. officials,” 
Reuters, July 19, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-usa-syria/trump-ends-
cia-arms-support-for-anti-assad-syria-rebels-u-s-officials-idUSKBN1A42KC. 
33 CIA, “INTelligence: Human Intelligence,” 2013.  
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Actors 
The first actor identified is known as an intelligence officer. These are individuals 
employed by an intelligence agency, such as the CIA, to assess, develop, recruit, and run 
potential assets.34 The second critical actor within HUMINT operations is the asset or agent, 
terms which are used interchangeably throughout the remainder of this work. An asset is an 
individual that has been identified, targeted, and sought out by an intelligence officer because of 
their access to protected information and their potential vulnerability to defection (defined and 
discussed later in this chapter).35 While intelligence officers are employees of a given 
intelligence agency, assets are affiliated with intelligence agencies because of their cooperation 
with the foreign intelligence agency throughout the process of their defection, yet, are not agency 
employees. Assets can include, but are not limited to, diplomats, scientists, and military 
personnel. Another potentially valuable asset to a country is an intelligence officer from a 
foreign agency. “Flipping” a foreign intelligence officer would give an intelligence agency a 
direct line to information within the foreign agency and critical information within the foreign 
government. While both actors are a vital component to HUMINT they vary in their roles, with 
the officer being a government employee collecting information from an asset; and the asset, an 
individual engaged in giving the information intended as a state secret for their country, to a 
foreign intelligence officer. 
Current and Future Roles of HUMINT 
As previously noted, there are a variety of non-HUMINT collection methods that 
intelligence agencies use to collect information on other countries, such as X number of missiles 
																																																								
34 Jack Devine, Good Hunting, ed. Vernon Loeb (New York: Picador, 2014). 
35 Ibid. 
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have moved. Sources of collection are always limited and therefore, an intelligence agency needs 
to gather intelligence from multiple sources to be able to fully understand a situation, event, etc. 
Many of the sources can provide the “what” to an opposition’s activities, however, fail to 
provide the “why”. To fill in the gap of “why” for an opposition’s activity, intelligence agencies 
turn to HUMINT.36 Without HUMINT, a government would be able to know what, where, and 
when things are happening in another country but would lack a definitive understanding of the 
intention behind the given action. Another role that HUMINT actors play is in protecting the 
classified information they are privy to. An example can be found when looking to Aldrich 
Ames, a case that will be discussed extensively in Chapter 4. After being compromised, Ames’ 
information led to the deaths of numerous intelligence agents run by the U.S. during the Cold 
War and post-Cold War era.37 He failed to protect information entrusted to him by the CIA, 
regarding the identity of assets being run by the CIA, which lead to their trials and execution. For 
the reasons above, the CIA and the intelligence community closely protects their sources and 
methods when carrying out intelligence operations. 
The use of HUMINT dates back to the 1940’s during WW2 when the OSS (the CIA’s 
predecessor) used HUMINT sources to gather information on Nazi positions to better support the 
D-Day invasion.38  The Cold War is full of examples of the use of HUMINT sources for 
information collection and protection. Today, the use of HUMINT sources continues, such as 
																																																								
36 Ronald Kessler, Inside the CIA (New York, NY: Pocket Books, 1992). 
37 James Adams, Sell Out (Viking Adult, 1995).  
38 Central Intelligence Agency, “The Office of Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence 
Agency,” library, last modified September 6, 2017, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/intelligence-history/oss. 
   16 
their use to counter rival state; in the case of China, aid their pursuit and theft of trade secrets;39 
and in the defending against domestic and international terrorist threats.  
HUMINT has proven invaluable in the past, however, technological advances, especially 
in collection efforts within the cyber domain and developments in imagery intelligence (IMINT) 
collection (including satellite imagery collection), call into question its continued use. While 
there is an abundance of individuals calling for its fall, there are numerous supports that 
recognize the continued utility of HUMINT. One main advocate of continued use of HUMINT 
collections operations is the Deputy Director of the CIA, David Cohen. In a speech at Cornell 
University, he discussed how the Director of the CIA, John Brennan (at the time), had proposed 
a two-prong approach to the future of intelligence activities, in which HUMINT collection would 
play an indispensable role because of the ability for it to explain what adversaries intended to do. 
While acknowledging the importance of SIGINT and other forms of collection in revealing what 
is happening in other countries, Cohen stresses that HUMINT sources can explain the “why” and 
the overall “what” of the activities of other countries, organizations, and networks.40 A second 
example of support for the continued use of HUMINT collection is less evident, however, can be 
found in the hiring of positions for 35M (HUMINT collectors) in the U.S. Army, Operations 
Officers (HUMINT collectors in the CIA), and other HUMINT related jobs in both the private 
and public sectors. Cohen’s speech, focusing on the future importance HUMINT operations, and 
the continual hiring push within the field of HUMINT demonstrates the prominent role that 
HUMINT will continue to play in the future.  
																																																								
39 Katie Benner, “Chinese Intelligence Officers Accused of Stealing Aerospace Secrets,” The 
New York Times, October 30, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/30/us/politics/justice-
department-china-espionage.html. 
40 Cohen, David, “The CIA of the Future,” remarks delivered to LaFeber-Silbey Endowment in 
History (Lecture, Cornell University, September 17, 2015). 
   17 
 HUMINT has shown its importance in the ability to fill in “intelligence gaps” prior to the 
creation of the CIA, the U.S.’s first peace time intelligence agency. The growth, development, 
and role of HUMINT during the Cold War solidified it as being a premier source of intelligence 
and its current use in combating rival states, military challenges, and domestic and international 
terrorism make it an indispensable source of information. Finally, the continued prevalence of 
HUMINT operations to the intelligence community is evident in Deputy Director Cohen’s 
speech focusing on the continued use of HUMINT to lead the CIA in the future and the 
abundance of HUMINT opportunities within the public and private sector. 41 These components 
make HUMINT a foundational component of intelligence communities’ to study and understand 
to the fullest extent. 
 
Study of Motivation for Defection 
 Building upon the actors outlined above, the following section continues to look at the 
process of HUMINT by defining defection and motivation, iterates the importance of studying 
these concepts, and the role they play in promoting national and international security.  
Defection 
 The way in which assets give secret information from their country to a foreign 
intelligence service (FIS) varies from being approached by an intelligence officer and asked to 
work for a foreign intelligence agency, while others “walk-in” and volunteer their services to the 
other country. In either case, it can be said that the intelligence source is defecting to the country 
they are providing information to.  
																																																								
41 Ibid. 
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Previously, Phillip Lutscher has defined defection as switching sides from the regime to 
the rebellion,42 while Shahzeen operationalized it as the absence of fulfilling an action.43 
Lutscher’s definition stood for the choice to go against one’s regime in favor of a rebellion, 
while Shahzeen Attari’s definition meant that the individual deviated from the collective norm of 
making a donation. Both definitions were applicable in their respective studies, however, neither 
is applicable to the topic at hand. In the current study, the definition of defection will present 
itself as an ideal of sorts. One source that defines defection in terms of this ideological 
perspective is the Merriam-Webster dictionary. It defines defection as, “conscious abandonment 
of allegiance or duty.”44 This definition, although general, would suffice as the foundation for an 
operationalized concept of defection. It allows for the omission of “double agents”, those who 
pretend to be willing to help their opposition but are really still working for their home agency, 
from being classified as defectors. It also allows for the omission of those who unknowingly 
present their opposition with information about their homeland. The above definition is broad 
enough to include those who have been coerced, influenced, or manipulated, and voluntarily give 
information to another country. Finally, the definition allows for the wide interpretation of duty 
or allegiance. One’s duty could encompass the individual’s duty to keep the information they 
have access to secret, while also allowing for the inclusion of those who engage in espionage to 
betray their country (and ultimately their allegiance to it). This definition allows for a sufficient 
scope of subjects, yet also limits the field to those who are aware of their actions (not necessarily 
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the implications) and to those who are delivering information to another country with the 
intention of supplying valuable information (as opposed to a double agent who supplies 
sufficient evidence to support their cover). Therefore, the definition of defection used within the 
following chapters is, “the conscious abandonment of allegiance or duty by an individual 
operating within the intelligence community through the delivery of state secrets, or other acts of 
espionage, to another state”. 
 With this operationalization of defection, the role that it plays in the intelligence process 
becomes evident. Without defection, there would be no HUMINT. Without HUMINT, there 
would be gaps within the information that a country has, the implications of which have already 
been discussed at length. From this understanding, not only is defection an integral part of the 
intelligence cycle, but it can be seen as a starting point for collection efforts. Therefore, if one 
were to better understand defection, it would lead to increased efficiency within the intelligence 
processes, increases in national and international security, and boosting a state’s ability to more 
effectively prevent and detect defection. 
Motivation 
 Defection, previously defined, can be seen as a key component to the producing 
intelligence and in promoting national and international security. However, few, as this paper 
later illustrates, gain access to classified information with the goal of defecting. Therefore, 
another pertinent question becomes what leads an individual to defect. While the definition of 
motivation and the greater implications of motivation will be discussed in a later chapter, an 
explanation of its importance requires attention. To fully support intelligence collection there 
needs to be a deep understanding of defection, yet the question of what leads an individual to 
defect is just as important. Therefore, it is imperative to study the motivation that leads to 
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defection, because like the intelligence gap that would exist without the utilization of HUMINT, 
there would be a gap in the understanding of defection if one failed to study its root causes, 
referred to here as motivation.  
The previous chapter, broken into four sections, outlined the importance of what will be 
discussed in the following chapters. It demonstrated the vital role that intelligence plays in 
support of national and international security, discussing the various threats posed to a state and 
the international community and the ways intelligence agencies aid in combating them. It also 
focused on the characteristics, components of, and utility of HUMINT in pursuit of 
understanding the opposition. In all, the previous chapter has laid out two arguments: 1) Without 
the intelligence community, national and international security would be greatly compromised 
and 2) Failing to fully understand every component of HUMINT, including the role it plays in 
the intelligence community, the actors involved, motivation, and defection, would hinder a 
state’s ability to effectively counter national and international threats. All of these components 
lead to the same conclusion that many other authors, theorists, and practitioners have come to; 
the study of motivation and defection are important. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON MOTIVATION 
One key party, that is interested in understanding defection and its motivators, is the 
government that is being targeted by a FIS (virtually all governments within the international 
community). Their interest, in fully understanding the components of HUMINT and what leads 
to defection, stems from the need to prevent and (in worst case scenario) detect defection. The 
ability of a government to enact effective policies is contingent upon the expansiveness and 
validity of the information on a given subject. Therefore, to better understand whether current 
studies on motivation for defection within the intelligence community appropriately inform 
government policy, I delve into a variety of theoretical and practical applications of motivation 
studies. Within this chapter, I first present an analysis of previous theoretical literature around 
motivation within three fields of study: psychology, sociology, and social psychology, 
demonstrating the complexity and continued developments of motivational theory. The second 
section focuses on current efforts to studying motivation for defection within the intelligence 
community, attempting to utilize established theory. The chapter concludes with a breakdown of 
current efforts by the U.S. government to counter defection within the intelligence community by 
focusing on the pre-employment screening and selection process; opportunities, preventative 
action, and support services during employment that attempt to address identified factors that 
could potentially lead to defection; and post-employment services, separation, and preventative 
actions. Chapter 3 will not address the adequacy of the study of motivation for defection within 
the intelligence community, nor will it address its ability to inform current efforts in preventing 
defection. Focusing solely on understanding motivation from a theoretical perspective and in an 
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applied manner will allow me to effectively apply the information in the case studies, presented 
in Chapter 3. 
 
Theoretical Approaches to Motivational Studies 
While motivation has been of interest to intelligence agencies to leverage information to 
aid in their activities, the development of theories of motivation predates the use of HUMINT. 
There are three predominant scientific approaches to motivation that have been developed and 
continually expanded upon: psychological, sociological, and social psychological. The 
psychological approach sets motivational theory within the context of the internal processes of 
the brain, focusing primarily on the individual and their cognitive processes. In contrast to the 
psychological approach, the sociological perspective stems from Emile Durkheim’s work on 
social norms to determine how society functions through interactions among individuals 
according to “norms”.45 The final theoretical approach, social psychological, takes aspects of 
both psychological and sociological motivational theory by proposing that an individual’s 
motivation is determined by the interaction of their cognitive processes and societal factors. 
Psychology  
Psychology is the study of the relationship between the brain, the behavior of an 
individual, and their environment,46 with a heavy focus on the individual and their behavior 
through cognitive functions. While psychology has its origins in the lab of Wilhelm Wundt, who 
focused on developing structuralism,47 it has experienced developments in technology; the 
																																																								
45 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, ed. Mark Cladis, trans. Carol 
Cosman (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
46 APA, “Science of Psychology,” 2018.  
47Duane Schultz, A History of Modern Psychology (Cengage Learning, 2015). 
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incorporation of other scientific knowledge into their field of study; and paradigm shifts, that 
have contributed to its development and evolution.48  
The idea of structuralism, emerging from the work of Wilhelm Wundt, established 
psychology as a science through attempts to map the structure of human consciousness.49 These 
attempts were quickly overshadowed by motivation theory. William James’ theory of 
fundamentalism quickly preceded Wundt and structuralism, proposing that humans act out of 
their innate behaviors such as crying, love, sympathy, and fear of dark (some of the list was later 
proven learned behavior) yet interact with and are shaped by daily behaviors called habits.50 One 
difficulty that William’s theory posed was the exclusion of the idea of human consciousness. 
Sigmund Freud soon became the predominant theorist with what has become known as 
psychoanalysis. This motivational theoretical perspective concluded that the id, ego, and super 
ego, through creating internal conflict, ultimately determine the motivation for one’s actions.51 
Freud’s theory built upon his predecessors by postulating that an individual’s innate behaviors 
(id) were continually being moderated for socially acceptable behavior (ego), while both were 
placed within an internal moral framework (superego). 
 These previous practitioners were focused on the internal processes of an individual, at 
the time, were unable to be quantified. This led to John Watson to seek to control and manipulate 
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behavior by studying it “objectively”, giving birth to behaviorism.52 To better understand 
motivation and what drives behavior, Watson focused on classical conditioning, observations 
aimed at eliciting a reaction of the respondent to a neutral stimulus. Watson’s infamous “Little 
Albert”, where he instilled fear in a child by showing him a white rat paired with a loud clang,53 
best exemplifies this concept. Adding to this work, B.F. Skinner introduced the ideas of positive 
and negative reinforcement. In his “Skinner Box” experiments, a rat was rewarded with food if it 
pressed a lever (positive reinforcement), while in a separate experiment, if the rat pressed a lever 
it would turn an administered shock off (negative reinforcement.54 Behaviorists, in essence, 
studied animals’ most foundational motivators, instincts, yet, their work also introduced a 
component of consciousness. 
 This component of consciousness is expanded upon by Albert Bandura, who developed 
Social Learning Theory. Bandura’s prominent experiment involved children watching a video of 
adults acting out certain actions on a Bobo Doll, which the children, after viewing, would 
recreate aggression (or passivity) towards the doll when exposed to that variable.55 His 
observations led to the proposition of a three-pronged system for learning and behavior. The first 
aspect was the stimuli, when it happened, how it was presented, and in what context it occurred. 
The more similar the subject identified with the situation in which the stimuli occurred, the more 
likely it was to be replicated. The second component is the feedback (reward, punishment, or 
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other type of reinforcement) given for the learned action. If an action had more positive 
feedback, it was more likely to be replicated. And third, the internal cognitive functions of the 
individual would lend the individual to act in a particular manner (based off previous 
experiences, memories, etc.).56 Bandura’s proposal led to a blossoming in psychology’s 
understanding of motivation and behavior; that an individual is driven to act because of an 
interaction of their mental processes that have been shaped by learned behaviors over time with 
the current stimuli presented to them at a given moment. 
Bandura’s theory, in conjunction with significant neuro-imaging and mapping 
technological advancements, 57 led to the development of the positivist approach. This approach 
seeks to make the lives of individuals better through developing an understanding of oneself.58 
One critical contribution by positivists, towards motivation, is a deeper understanding of mental 
disorders. In support of understanding these disorders, psychologists created the DSM (the tool 
used to determine whether a patient has a disorder and the severity of that disorder), which 
discusses the symptomology and effects of a given disorder. Identified disorders include 
disorders that can be mitigated by therapy and medication, such as general anxiety disorder, 59 to 
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disorders that prevent an individual from living a “normal” life, such as schizophrenia. 60 In all, 
the contributions brought forward by positivists bring a psychological focus to motivational 
research by determining that an individual’s mental state plays a critical role in determining an 
individual’s behavioral pattern. 
While the previous analysis focused on a few of psychology’s contributions to literature 
on motivation, it is in no way a complete record of the contributions of the field. Yet, even in its 
brief account, this section has demonstrated that motivation is a complex issue to evaluate and 
determine the extent of what it is and what spurs it in an individual; that psychology has 
developed over time through the increased knowledge in the subject matter and advancements in 
technology; and that modern psychology continues to look into the question of, motivation 
through a clinical approach. Psychology has also demonstrated the value in developing theories 
as a framework to determine motivation. Without the established frameworks that psychologists 
developed and utilized, there would have been no cohesive understanding of the parameters of 
the drivers of motivation and thus, no advancement of knowledge.61  
Sociology  
According to the American Sociological Association (ASA), sociology is “the study of 
our behavior as social beings, covering everything from the analysis of short contacts between 
anonymous individuals on the street to the study of global social processes.”62 This definition of 
leads to an evaluation of the field to expand beyond what many define as academic sociologists. 
In looking at limiting the scope of research, the following section focuses on the development of 
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sociological motivation theory stemming from Emile Durkheim’s work by discussing the 
foundation of norms and values, the explanations for why individuals abide by norms and values, 
and the reasons why individuals would break from these norms (deviation).  
Spurring from an interest in the shifting social atmosphere brought about by the Industrial 
Revolution and “crises engendered by war,”63 Emile Durkheim sought to answer the question of, 
“What keeps society functioning?” In summation, Durkheim concluded that social cohesion, 
defined as individuals working together for a common cause, is fundamental to the preservation 
of society and that social cohesion is derived from a common sense of cultural norms, beliefs, 
and values, helping guide the actions of individuals (and communities).64 In developing this idea, 
Durkheim assessed that norms are the values, decisions, and courses of action that a given 
culture, community, or group finds desirable or appropriate.65 This characterization of norms and 
social cohesion has led sociologists to continually theorize why individuals follow (or not 
follow) these agreed upon norms. 
In an attempt to better understand this essential question of “why people abide by 
norms?” Talcott Parsons and Edwards Shill developed the theory of internalization of social 
norms, which postulates that individuals act in accordance with established norms because they 
have identified with the norms presented by a community and accepted them as their personal 
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values.66 Joanne Smith and Deborah Terry pose a second explanation with social identity theory, 
determining that individual identifies with the community; that an individual acts according to 
the group’s norms; and that they see themselves as an extension of that community, not a 
separate entity.67 This evaluation is supported by the work of Roderick Kramer and Marilynn 
Brewer, which concluded that when individuals are presented with a situation in which they 
share in the repercussions of their decisions as a group, they are more inclined to align their 
decision making with those in the group.68 David Lewis uses a third perspective in explaining the 
reason for individuals to follow a set of given norms. In his book, Lewis focuses on the idea of 
rational choice in explaining that individuals choose to follow the given norms because the 
benefits to following the norms are greater than if the individual was to deviate from the norm;69 
the idea that a choice is merely a logical cost-benefit assessment. 
The theories presented above provided valuable insight into why an individual would 
abide by norms, however, fails to provide a framework to understand why an individual wouldn’t 
abide by proscribed norms. This leads to the concept of deviance, or deviant behavior, defined as 
actions that diverge from the normative behaviors of a given group or community.70 The fluidity 
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of deviance, like social norms, 71 has led to the proposition of three main theories: social strain 
theory, control theory, and labeling theory.72 The first of these, social strain theory is one facet of 
Albert Cohen’s work. Cohen theorizes that if an individual is unable to reach their goals 
(whether norm-abiding or not) through “norms”, due to factors such as social status or available 
resources, it will result in “strain”, results in them turning to deviant behavior to achieve their 
goals. 73 Yet, the likelihood that an individual will resort to deviant behavior is exacerbated by a 
disassociation with conventional institutions or active association with groups or individuals who 
reinforce their deviant behavior.74  
 A second theory posed is social control theory, which assess that the social bonds an 
individual develops with institutions and groups that support societal norms, lead to the reining 
in of individual’s deviant behaviors.75 The four bonds posed by this theory are: 1) Attachment, 
how loyal an individual is to the institutions; 2) Commitment, the amount that an individual 
values their participation in the institutions; 3) Involvement, the amount of time spent engaging 
in “conventional activities”; and 4) Belief, the degree to which one accepts the community’s 
norms.76 An absence of these social bonds leads an individual to engage in deviant behavior 
because people are amoral and would engage in deviant behavior, to achieve one’s goal, if not 
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for the reining in of their behavior via these institutions and groups.77 A final sociological theory 
is labeling theory. In this theory, when an individual acts in a deviant, or evil, manner, the label 
ascribed to their behavior is also ascribed to the individual by society. 78 The individual in turn to 
being labeled deviant by the community is treated as less than others, leading to the 
internalization of the labeling, and in turn perpetuating the deviant characteristics.79 Labeling 
theory can be seen as a type of internalization theory that was expanded beyond the reason that 
an individual would abide by social norms. The individuals, labeled as deviant, internalize the 
values that the community has told them they have, instead of the values that the community 
itself holds.  
The sociological theories of motivation discussed in this section proposed reason an 
individual would abide by proscribed norms and why an individual would deviate from these 
norms. The understanding of the vitality that social norms play in motivating an individual to act 
in a given pattern led theorists to determine that these societal pressures must be evaluated in 
conjunction with an individual’s internal processes. This realization mirrors psychologists’ 
understanding that societal factors contribute to motivation, both of which, ultimately led to the 
creation of the social psychological approach. 
Social Psychology  
The previous discussions on psychological and sociological theories of motivation, 
revealed dynamic scientific fields of study with unique contributions to literature on motivation 
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studies. The emphasis of psychology is the study of the brain, its functions, and the interaction 
between the brain and an individual’s behavior. Motivational theory in sociology, stemming 
from Emile Durkheim’s work on social norms, postulated numerous reasons as to why an 
individual would act according to social norms or in a deviant manner. Yet, while both fields 
have unique contribution to the understanding of motivation, current motivational theory 
practitioners accept that one’s internal processes and environment are critical in motivating an 
individual, leading to the emergence of social psychology. Social psychologists evaluate 
individuals’ experience as a whole, including their cognitive functions, emotions, and 
perceptions alongside the study of group phenomena and social trends, to provide a deeper 
understanding of motivation and decision-making.80 This field has thus produced theories that 
provide the most comprehensive understanding of motivation discussed and lays the foundation 
for much of those directing their research toward motivation for defection within the intelligence 
community, discussed in depth later.  
Some of the most important contributions towards the understanding of motivation aided 
in the establishment of the field of social psychology; one such theorist was Kurt Lewis. In his 
proposition of Lewinian Field Theory,81 he countered the idea of rational choice theory, by 
incorporating the variables which would lead an individual to act, evaluating the course of action 
that an individual could take, and in a perfect situation, be able to accurately predict the future 
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courses of action that an individual would take based on the variables present.82 This theorization 
is simplified in the “Lewinian Equation” of B= f(P,E), where behavior (B) is the result of both 
the person (P), including their neurological makeup, and their environment (E), to include the 
social institutions and their “life-space”.83 However, this theory was rebuffed by 
Abraham Maslow, proposing motivation was driven by a hierarchy of needs. In his theory, 
Maslow proposes that an individual’s needs are established in a hierarchy format with five levels 
ranging from physiological needs, such as food and water, to psychological needs, such as self-
actualization.84 Both theories, while differing in structure, define the importance that an 
individual’s internal processes and environment have in dictating one’s actions. 
 The field of social psychology began to shift to a focus on the internalization of a given 
situation and the effects on one’s actions, demonstrated in the work of Stanley Milgram and 
Philip Zimbardo. Milgram’s experiment saw a scientist (an authority figure) require his 
participants to administer increasing levels of “shock” to an unseen participant.85 At the 
conclusions of his observations, Milgram theorized that the majority of participants were willing 
to administer a lethal shock because: 1) The subject had internalized the sense of fulfilling one’s 
duty to carrying out the task at hand to overcome the moral conflict, and/or 2) Their perception 
of a given stimuli (the authority figure’s commands) dictated them to obey, allowing them to 
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circumvent their own moral apprehension.86 A second theorist that focused on authority and 
internalization is Philip Zimbardo. Zimbardo’s most known Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE), 
led him to conclude that different situations apply different levels of pressure on an individual; 
that from these situational pressures, situational power is ascribed to particular groups, leading to 
the ambiguity of how they should act, what their roles are, and how the roles should be carried 
out; and individuals in a given role internalized that role, leading to them acting out their 
ascribed role, as they have conceived their respective role, regardless of who they were 
interacting with.87 The work of both practitioners demonstrates the effect that a given 
environment or situation can have on an individual’s perception and ultimately their actions. 
 Taking into account the various theories and observations of previous practitioners, 
Richard Ryan and Edward Deci established Self-Determination Theory (SDT). SDT 
characterized by focusing not just on how one pursues a goal, but ultimately on what goals one 
chooses to pursue.88 This focus allowed Ryan and Deci identify two types of motivation, intrinsic 
and extrinsic. The first type, intrinsically motivated behavior, is an action that one engages in 
because of the inherent joy or interest they have in that behavior.89 These types of motivated 
actions are seen as innate in humans, yet are either “facilitated” or “undermined” by external 
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influences.90 The facilitation of intrinsically motivated actions occurs when an individual 
internalizes competence towards a given action, through “interpersonal events and structures” 
such as rewards and positive feedback, and that the action is of their own accord.91 The 
undermining of these intrinsically motivated actions arise from checks imposed by social 
institutions including negative reinforcement, punishment, and mandated to engage in the 
behavior, leading to a decrease in the intrinsically motivated actions.92  
 The second type of motivation noted is external motivation. Externally motivated 
behavior or outcome-based behaviors are behaviors that are engaged in for the sole purpose of 
achieving a given result.93 Extrinsic motivators are further broken down into three types: external 
regulation, introjected regulation, and integrated regulation. External regulation behaviors are 
engaged in solely to elicit an external reward, as demonstrated in operant conditioning 
experiments.94 The second type, introjected regulation, encourages an individual to engage in 
behaviors that are the result of the desire to avoid guilt, induce pride, or raise self-esteem.95 
Finally, integrated regulation is an external motivation where an individual has internalized the 
regulatory behavior and aligned the new behavior with their norms.96  This assessment of 
external motivators includes “traditional motivators”, such as money and praise; it includes 
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“internal” rewards, such as self-esteem and pride; and it also demonstrates that an external 
motivator is able to “shift” to an intrinsic motivator if the actor begins to achieve satisfaction 
from the behavior in itself. 
 Throughout their work, social psychologists have: 1) Concluded that  social pressures and 
influences can have a significant impact on the internal processes of an individual; 2) One’s 
environment poses a variety of constraints and regulations on their motivations; and 3) The line 
between an internal and external motivator is fluid, influencing not just how an individual acts, 
but also what they act upon. However, the work of social psychologists was not developed in a 
vacuum, but was the result of the diligent work of psychologists and sociologists. The work of 
these three fields all provide a unique understanding of an individual’s motivation through their 
implementation of theories either focusing on an individual’s internal processes, social 
institutions, or a combination of both. This deeper understanding of motivation, through the 
analysis of these theories, provides various frameworks from which to understand the following 
discussion of research that focuses on the motivation for defection within the intelligence 
community. 
 
Defection of Individuals Within the Intelligence Community 
 The work discussed in the previous section was the result of numerous years of scientific 
evolution and dedication to the theoretical development of motivation. The predominant field of 
study that emerged, social psychology, dictates that one must take into account both 
psychological and sociological factors when evaluating motivation. Taking into account this 
conclusion, those studying motivation for defection in the intelligence community have 
attempted to utilize these frameworks to support their research. The following discussion 
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presents the work of practitioners, that are applying motivational studies, to develop an 
understanding of the current research that informs U.S. government policy aimed at preventing 
and detecting defection within the intelligence community.  
 Since the development of HUMINT, enticing a potential agent to defect (recruitment) has 
been an undeniable goal of intelligence officers. This process is known as the Agent Recruitment 
Cycle (ARC) and is summed up in seven steps: 1) spotting, the involvement in groups or places 
that would expose the officer to potential agents; 2) assessing, identifying a potential target; 3) 
development, actual contact with the assessed target including levels of contact from infrequent 
to frequent; 4) pitching, or the actual proposal for the agent to work with the intelligence officer; 
5) formalization, when given a “yes” the officer and agent outline the specifics of their 
relationship including expectations, compensations, and timeline; 6) producing, the actual 
collection of intelligence by the officer via the agent; and 7) termination, the conclusion of the 
relationship.97  
To better assist intelligence officers in the assessing, development, and pitching of an 
agent, the intelligence community developed the acronym “MICE”. This acronym, which stands 
for money, ideology, coercion (or compromise), and ego,98 is designed to help intelligence 
officer’s understand what part of an individual’s motivation is leverageable to entice the agent to 
defect. In response to MICE, Randy Burkett sought to provide a more expansive tool that focuses 
on manipulating the perception of the asset. He proposes the use of RASCLS, which stands for 
reciprocation, authority, scarcity, commitment and consistency, liking, and social proof.99 This 
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tool outlines behaviors and an “atmosphere” that officers should promote to entice an individual 
to defect, as opposed to attempting to understand the motivation of the asset. These tools, 
presented as attempts to understand motivation and perception, are intended to help an 
intelligence officer move an asset through the ARC.  
As opposed to the development of MICE and RASCLS, the work of Lydia Wilson 
attempts to understand the underlying causes of defection through the application of reversal 
theory. She seeks to explain why an individual would shift from “a normal conforming life to 
rebelliousness through risk taking and espionage”.100 Reversal theory claims there are four pairs 
of “domains” supporting eight “motivational states”, that individuals are continually fluctuating 
between these states, and that changes in these motivational state illicit different responses due to 
variation in given situations or state of mind.101 Wilson concludes that, in the face of a 
“triggering event”, an individual’s inability to freely shift between motivational states and a lack 
of protective frames, or coping mechanisms, leads to defection.102  
A second attempt to identifying the underlying causes of defection is posed by Dr. Ursula 
Wilder, a CIA psychologist. In taking a clinical psychological approach, she established a three-
pronged approach to developing an understanding of motivation for defection, which include 
personality pathology; an “acute personal crisis resulting in intense duress” or a triggering event; 
and an ease of opportunity to conduct espionage.103 Identified personality defects include a lack 
of understanding of the implications for an individual’s actions, a sense that one is “above the 
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rules”, and impulsivity for risky behaviors. 104 Wilder discusses that these characteristics, 
exacerbated by an intense personal crisis leads to distress, which results in impulsive 
decisions.105 The final aspect of Wilder’s three-pronged approach is the ease of opportunity to 
conduct the espionage. Without going into depth on this aspect, Wilder’s work illustrates the 
necessity for the defector to have frequent access to classified information and a “customer” to 
deliver the information to.106 Supplementing her three-prong approach to what leads to defection, 
Wilder identifies that individuals with “healthy personalities”  are able to operate within stressful 
conditions because of sufficient coping mechanisms; have relatively stable moods; exemplify 
moral behavior across a variety of situations; and have/experience a spectrum of emotions.107  
Both Wilson and Wilder advanced the field of defection studies beyond the realm of 
“tools for intelligence officers” by seeking to understand the underlying causes of what leads to 
defection. Their conclusions identify that an individual’s personality predisposition, coupled with 
a “triggering event”, ultimately leads an individual to defect. Wilder took her proposition 
forward by proposing that people with healthy personalities don’t defect, noting that they have 
an ability to experience an emotional range, yet, have the ability to emotionally navigate stressful 
situations.  
A final approach, that attempts to incorporate an understanding of the motivator for 
defection and the underlying factors that led an individual to defect, is Katherine Herbig’s big-
data analytic approach. Using data from the Defense Personnel Security Research Center’s 
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(PERSEC) Espionage Database, an aggregation of unclassified information on defection cases, 
108 Herbig evaluated variables ranging from motivation for defection to the organization and 
clearance level of the individual that defected.109 In her analysis, she identified five primary 
trends. First, that the majority of defectors had foreign influences, such as foreign citizenship, 
family ties, or connections.110 Second, only a limited number of defectors had drug, financial, or 
gambling problems.111 Third, the most common motivators were: first, financial compensation; 
second, divided loyalties; and third, disgruntlement. Additionally, ingratiation, coercion, thrills, 
and recognition are strong motivators. 112 A final observation was that a triggering event, in 
conjunction with other motivators, was a primary factor leading to defection.113  Herbig’s 
approach took a macro-level approach to understanding motivator for defection, providing 
researchers vital trend analysis to be used in the future.   
This section demonstrated that those studying motivation for defection within the 
intelligence community: cultivated an understanding of motivation by developing tools to aid 
intelligence officers in enticing defection; that an individual’s environment, in conjunction with 
their internal processes, motivate an individual; and that there are a myriad of factors when 
identifying what motivates an individual to defect. While presenting numerous trends and 
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observations, those looking at defection within the intelligence community failed to operate 
within a theoretical framework, which led to the observation that money, divergent loyalties, 
disgruntlement, psychological components, and triggering events all play a critical role in an 
individual’s defection. 
 
Current Methods in Preventing Defection 
The U.S. government has identified a need to prevent and detect defection within the 
intelligence community in support of the advancement of national and international security. 
Taking their lead from those directing their research at motivation for defection, they have 
sought to prevent defection by countering five factors that have been assessed to lead an 
individual to defect: money, divergent loyalties, disgruntlement, psychological components, and 
triggering events. In its efforts to prevent and detect defection, the U.S. government utilizes a 
combination of pre-employment screenings; opportunities, preventative action, and services 
during employment; and post-employment services and measures.  
Pre-Employment Screening 
 Unlike many other companies and organizations, accepting an offer to a position within 
the intelligence community is a substantial process, beginning with an individual passing a 
polygraph examination and obtaining a top-secret security clearance with access to sensitive 
compartmental information (TS/SCI with Poly).114 The adjudication process (obtaining the 
aforementioned clearances) is overseen by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Using 
the following 13 categories as a framework, the OPM, evaluates the suitability of a candidate 
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through a variety of investigative techniques: allegiance to the U.S., foreign influence, foreign 
preference, sexual behavior, personal conduct, financial considerations, alcohol consumption, 
drug involvement, psychological conditions, criminal conduct, handling protected information, 
outside activities, and use of information systems.115  
 The first step for an applicant begins prior to an individual’s application for employment 
by limiting clearances to U.S. citizens only.116 Once confirmed as a U.S. citizen, an applicant 
then submits an SF-86, an extensive questionnaire that covers various aspects of an individual’s 
life and focuses on the 13 OPM categories.117 The applicant’s public records, such as taxes and 
credit record, are pulled and compared with the answers presented in the SF-86. If the 
information is corroborated, the individual is then brought in for an in-person interview with an 
investigator to reaffirm the information within the submitted form. The applicant then sits for a 
polygraph examination to further verify the information within the SF-86 and any other 
“questionable” activity that arose during the in-person investigation. The examination focuses on 
the accuracy of the individual’s SF-86, the level of candor that the applicant has exhibited in 
regards to their application, foreign interests and loyalties, and personal choices, such as drug 
usage, ultimately determining if the individual has integrity or if there are existing vulnerabilities 
that could lead to defection.118 Once concluded, these initial steps are followed by a series of 
additional investigative steps.  
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 The first is a psychological examination that evaluates an individual’s past, present, 
and/or future drug usage, personality traits, or other aspects of their psychological profile that 
could lend to a predisposition to defection.119 This is followed with a series of in-person 
interviews with the applicant’s family, friends, and neighbors along with personal and 
professional references provided on the SF-86, in an attempt to ascertain any additional 
information that was not disclosed or contradicts previous findings in the process.120 In 
concluding the investigative process, the application then moves to the OPM to evaluate the 
individual, taking a case-by-case approach to their decision. Lin their process, the OPM looks at 
the whole person and evaluates potential situations of “concern” by taking into account the 
severity of a situation, the duration of it, how long ago it was, the impact it had on the applicant, 
and the propensity for it to happen again.121 If found favorable, the applicant is “successfully 
adjudicated” and granted their TS/SCI with Poly, thus able to access classification when they 
have a “need to know”.  
 On average, the clearance process can take between 9-12 months, 122 however, can take as 
long as 24 months, depending on the extent of international contacts. The timeline and 
redundancies within this process demonstrate the lengths that the U.S. government goes through 
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Opportunities, Preventative Action, and Services During Employment 
 In denying individuals with a predisposition for defection from accessing classified 
information, the government is also denying them the ability to defect. However, the clearance 
process is the way to begin to do one’s job within the intelligence community. Work within the 
intelligence community is characterized as secretive, fast-paced, and stressful, 123 all of which 
could lead to adverse responses, such as defection. Identifying that an individual could revert to 
maladaptive behavior within this novel atmosphere, 124 agencies within the intelligence 
community have developed a number of opportunities and support services, coupled with 
proactive preventative measures, aimed at mitigating potentially triggering events. 
 Some of the noteworthy programs and services provided through the various intelligence 
agencies include fiscal support through the paying off of student loans or tuition 
reimbursement;125 family support services that provide family members a more in-depth 
understanding of the intelligence organization that the intelligence officer works for; 
opportunities to develop relationships within the intelligence organization through resource 
groups;126 and opportunities for a flexible schedule and hours.127 These programs are intended to 
lighten financial burdens, develop a sense of “alignment” with the agency their working with, 
and demonstrate that the U.S. government cares about the wellbeing of them and their families.  
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 While providing the above services, the government also takes a proactive approach to 
defection prevention and detection through the periodic reinvestigation of employees. Every five 
years, an individual with access to classified information must undergo a similar adjudication 
process as outlined above to reassert their suitability.128 The nature of the intelligence 
community, working with classified information and foreign nationals, lends an individual to 
become increasingly more exposed to opportunities to “breach” any of the OPM’s 13 categories. 
Reinvestigations allows the government to find and revoke access for those that are predisposed 
to defection or, in more a more dire situation, identify those who have already defected and have 
yet to be discovered. 
Post-Employment Services and Actions 
 In the wake of a separation of employee from the intelligence community, the 
government must take steps to prevent the defection of an individual because while they may not 
currently have tangible access to classified information, they don’t “forget” all the intelligence, 
sources, and methods that they worked with throughout their career. To address this constant 
threat posed by former employees, the government takes steps to assist in their reintegration, 
takes proactive measures to prevent defection, or takes retroactive measures to mitigate further 
damage. The services and courses of action are determined by the way or reason for separation.  
 Under amicable conditions, such as career change or retirement, services are aimed at 
providing the individual a way to make a living and social reintegration. For many working in 
the intelligence community, one primary difficulty of applying for another job is that much of 
their career and experience is classified. To help navigate is situation, the intelligence 
community has created the publication review boards (PRB) that audits potential resumes for 
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classified material, which provides the intelligence officer an approved description of their 
activity, while protecting national secrets that may unintentionally be divulged.129 This same 
service is also used to edit books for classified information that former officers intend to publish, 
an avenue to garner intelligence community buy-in, while informing the public about 
intelligence activities and creating a livelihood for themselves outside of the intelligence 
community. Ultimately, the services by the PRB are designed to prevent disgruntlement of 
former employees and elicit intelligence community buy-in in the future protection of classified 
information. 
 A second opportunity that has been further established to help intelligence officers 
reintegrate into society are membership organizations. Two primary examples are the Central 
Intelligence Retirees Association (CIRA) and SIGNA society. These organizations provide 
scholarships to the families of previous employees of the CIA, implement community building 
events such as luncheons, and the publication of newsletters and directories to help keep 
members informed and connected.130 These organizations, while shrouded in secrecy, are 
designed to establish reintegration into society, outside of the intelligence community, while 
maintaining intimate connections with those that have lived similar lifestyles as themselves. 
These services demonstrate the government’s efforts at helping former intelligence employees 
reintegrate into a life outside of the intelligence community, reestablish social bonds, and 
maintain already established bonds (with those of similar experiences).  
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 As demonstrated above, the government has sought to protect its classified information, 
from those that left amicably, through services and cooperation. However, when an employee 
leaves under less favorable conditions, such as firing or losing one’s clearance, the government 
enacts measures to prevent the disclosure of state secrets. One initiative is that that U.S. 
government will pay for the former employee’s psychological and therapeutic services for a 
determined period.131 They are intended to help an individual cope with the separation, deal with 
any substance abuse issues, and with social reintegration. However, other times individuals are 
separated for more sever reasons and face criminal charges.132 Many instances of the less-
amicable separation of an intelligence employee is due to a serious breach of one (or multiple) of 
the OPM’s 13 categories, and many times is also a legal violation and will be treated as such.  
 The intelligence community’s first priority is to safeguard state secrets and will go to 
extraordinary lengths, such as firing and bringing criminal charges against former employees, to 
protect them. However, while fulfilling it’ obligation to protect state secrets, the intelligence 
community concurrently seeks to help former employees reintegrate into civilian life and fosters 
social connections between former employees and the various communities they are a part of. In 
effect, the intelligence community is preventing defection through advancing the lives of their 
employees’ post-employment, a win/win situation.133  
 The previous chapter evaluated how the fields of psychology and sociology developed 
theories to explain motivation. These theories were developed and refined through paradigm 
shifts and technological improvements, ultimately converging and leading to the field of social 
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psychology. Social psychologists established theoretical frameworks that postulate that 
motivation is determined by the interaction of environmental influences (external motivations) 
on an individual’s psychological processes (internal motivations). In seeking to apply an 
understanding of external and internal motivators, practitioners turned to directing their research 
at motivation for defection within the intelligence community. Their work, focusing on 
defection, developed tools to aid intelligence officers in enticing defection; assessed that 
personality predispositions, in conjunction with a triggering event, lead to an individual’s 
motivation to defect; and iterated that money, divergent loyalties, disgruntlement, psychological 
components, and triggering events play a critical role in determining motivation for defection. 
 Taking their understanding of defection from this body of literature, the U.S. government 
developed three main phases where they seek to prevent and detect defection: pre-employment 
screenings; opportunities, preventative action, and services during employment; and post-
employment services and retroactive measures. The first phase seeks to prevent a predisposed 
individual from accessing classified information. The second, established programs to decrease 
stressors that could lead to defection while continuing to ensure that individuals are suitable to 
access classified information. Finally, the third phase is intended to assist in the reintegration of 
individuals that have left the intelligence community under amicable terms and suppress the 
ability to compromise national security of those that have left under less amicable conditions. In 
all, the government, in their effort to prevent and detect defection use carrot and stick measures 
that were developed in light of the information provided by those studying motivation for 
defection within the intelligence community.  
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CHAPTER 4 
APPLICATION THROUGH CASE STUDIES 
 The following five cases of defection within the intelligence community demonstrate that 
those studying motivation for defection have failed to develop an extensive understanding of 
what truly motivates an individual to defect. This failure is evidenced by a reliance on the 
theoretical frameworks posed by psychologists, sociologists, and social psychologists to 
understand the motivation of a defector. The government’s ability to establish effective policies 
to prevent and detect defection is also impaired by the failures of those conducting direct 
research on defection, is within the intelligence community. To present an effective analysis, I 
use the defector’s past to identify any social or developmental factors; any diagnosed or sub-
threshold psychological conditions or pathologies; available testimonies from the defectors 
themselves, their families, or past coworkers on declared motivation; and the variables 
surrounding the actual act of defection to include the kinds of information compromised or 
frequency of the behavior. Taking this approach will allow me to effectively present the 
successes and failures of previous attempts in explaining the defection; the successes and failures 
of current governmental efforts in combating defection within the intelligence community; and to 
discuss whether alternatives to the chosen approaches posed any more viable in being able to 
determine or prevent the defection of a given case.  
 While having various positives, this approach does have an apparent deficiency. When 
presenting the cases, I will not be applied a standardized methodology of theoretical analysis. 
Instead, I will be utilizing various theoretical and applied perspectives in attempts to best 
understand what motivates an individual. This technique stems, first, from the privilege of 
hindsight, allowing me to highlight specific points of an individual, recognized by previous 
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research, to determine motivation. This approach, however, more importantly, is systemic due to 
the lack of theoretical foundation posed by those studying motivation for defection within the 
intelligence community. Therefore, through an evaluation of five case studies, this section 
presents an understanding of the factors, as assessed by the previously presented research, that 
lead to defection. While creating an intimate understanding of the motivation for defection, my 
analysis demonstrates that the study of motivation for defection within the intelligence has failed 
to develop a theoretical, and thus an incomplete, understanding of what motivates an individual 
to defect, resulting in failures by the government to prevent and detect defection. 
  
Case Selection 
 In evaluating the cases of John Walker, Robert Hanssen, Edward Howard, Ana Montes, 
and Aldrich Ames, I recognize my inability to evaluate all cases of defection within the 
intelligence community, and, in turn, have selected cases that provide an array of genders, 
intelligence agencies, motivating factors, and governmental actions/inactions. I also recognize 
that the presentation of only cases where an individual defected limits the understanding of 
factors that could have contributed to defection, however, my analysis is not focusing on what 
motivates an individual to defect within the intelligence community, but seeks to evaluate 
whether those that study motivation for defection within the intelligence community adequately 
inform government procedures to prevent and detect defection. Also absent from my analysis are 
those cases of defection that have not yet been discovered, or will not be discovered. Attending 
to these cases will not only be impossible by virtue of their continued undiscovered nature, 
however, as with the cases of those that work within the intelligence community, not the focus of 
my research.  
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 The following defectors being investigated, presented in chronological order, all began 
their activities against the U.S. during the Cold War, a period characterized by a bipolar 
structure,134 which limited the number of predominant international actors at the time to the U.S. 
and USSR, highlighting the ideological differences as a root of tensions between the two super 
powers.135 The tensions and superpower competition between the U.S. and USSR produced 142 
of 209 cases of espionage against the U.S. (available to the public) between 1949-1989.136 
Looking back to the most prolific time period of defection within the U.S. allows for a greater 
accumulation of information on the subjects being discussed as more information is declassified 
and made public. Another benefit is the vast number of intelligence agencies involved in the 
handling of classified information on a variety of topics to include South America, Russia, and 
China, providing diversity within the analysis via the agency that the individual worked for and 
the information they were privy to. In all, limiting the timeline provides the opportunity to 
analyze cases of defectors across a vast number of agencies and intelligence material; allows for 
accessed to increasingly more comprehensive information on the cases being discussed (because 
of declassification, etc.); and includes the development and evolution of the U.S. government’s 
response and measures focusing on defection prevention.  
 
John A. Walker Jr. 
 John Walker Jr. was a Naval communications officer who had access to secure SIGINT 
and cyphers and, post-retirement from the Navy, intelligence material his remaining “network” 
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was able to acquire and deliver, selling much of this information to the USSR from 1968 until his 
arrest in 1985.137 Walker’s past and the way in which he carried out his defection activities 
support the previous conclusions that an individual’s personality influences an individual’s 
propensity to defect and that an individual’s motivation can change over time. However, 
Walker’s case also presents a critique to the previous research in that the factors leading to his 
defection blur the lines between internal and external motivators, all of which must be 
considered when evaluating his motivation for defection.  
 John Walker’s childhood is best described as troubling, which consisted of being raised 
by an abusive alcoholic father; attending a Catholic school where he rebelled against the 
perceived harshness of the nuns, garnering poor grades; and engaging in criminal behavior such 
as burglary.138 Walker also saw himself continually competing with his older brother, who 
achieved good grades, better social standing, and an overall social “success”.139 However, this 
brother would prove to be Walker’s lifeline, where after one of Walker’s arrests and convictions, 
his brother sought leniency from the judge, providing Walker the opportunity to join the Navy in 
October of 1955. Once in the Navy, Walker’s deviant behavior seemed to stop, being recognized 
as “highly competent,” quickly rising to the rank of warrant officer, and serving on a variety of 
vessels, establishing a successful career in communications working with classified 
cryptographic equipment.140 Walker’s life post-1955 would suggest that he left his life of crime 
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and delinquency by establishing a reputation as a hard-working naval officer and relatively stable 
and happy personal life,141 until October of 1967, when John Walker’s successes would unravel 
when he walked into the USSR embassy and sold a piece of the classified cryptographic 
information he worked with, solidifying his defection from the U.S. to the USSR.142  
 Walker’s later defection activities included more than delivering classified information he 
had direct access to by recruiting his brother Author Walker; son, Michael Walker; and friend 
Jerry Whitworth, along with numerous failed attempts to recruit his daughter, Laura Snyder.143 
This group of defectors became an established spy ring that fed classified information to Walker, 
who in turn sold it to the USSR. In 1985, after establishing a spy ring within the U.S. military; 
compromising secure naval communication channels that revealed critical information on missile 
defense systems, capabilities, and technology; and the compromising of U.S. sea defenses, 
operations, and capabilities, Walker was arrested, convicted, and sentenced to life in prison, 
where he died in 2014.144 
 John Walker’s life, prior to his defection, was characterized by crime and delinquency 
until his employment with the Navy, where he excelled in his work; a lifestyle shift explained by 
sociologists. The primary proposition by sociologists, to support Walker’s shift in his choices, is 
the impact of increased establishment of social ties. Within the literature on Walker’s life, he is 
seen to have enjoyed his work within the smaller divisions, developing close ties with his 
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coworkers and an appreciation for the work that he was doing,145 leading Walker to either 
internalize the new group norms or to meet their norms to achieve a desired outcome. Walker’s 
eventual defection calls into question the underlying nature in the shift of his actions, where Dr. 
Ursula Wilder’s work presents another view of what led to Walker’s behavioral shift.  
Ursula Wilder’s work focuses on personality and psychological disorders that influence 
an individual’s actions, discussing various traits that impact an individual’s defection, such as 
psychopathy. Wilder’s identification of Walker’s psychopathic tendencies provides insight into 
this pivotal shift in Walker’s life. His psychopathic tendencies lend to the belief that the shift 
arose from the ability to leave a good first impression on his new group; the manipulation of the 
perspective of past acquaintances that he was now a “success” (specifically his older brother 
Author who was also in the Navy); and the development of personal relationships for 
exploitation later.146 This shift from deviance to the “model sailor” is one glimpse into the early 
emergence of the effect that Walker’s personality had on his motivation. Wilder’s postulation 
that Walker has psychopathic personality traits draws upon his defection and his desire and 
ability to recruit additional agents to defect.147  
One key component of Walker’s defection was that he was a walk-in, meaning that he 
approached the USSR, as opposed to them coming to him. At the time of Walker’s defection, he 
engaged in various behaviors, a time of perceived decline in importance to others, demonstrating 
a desire to elevate his status and image, an additional psychopathic characteristic. The first aspect 
of his life endorsing this claim is his declining role within the Navy. Walker was past the 
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highlight of his early career, characterized by plank-ownership (being a founding member of a 
crew) and rapid advancements, which was quickly followed by an integration into larger crews, 
where his impact was less significant that before.148 Another aspect of this time in Walker’s life 
was his increasing infidelity to his wife. During the time leading to his defection, Walker had 
multiple affairs with other women; showing little remorse for the pain he caused his wife and 
their family,149 further validating Wilder’s claims that Walker exemplified psychopathic 
tendencies. In all, John Walker’s personality led him to lead a life of change, from deviance to 
excellence (within the Navy), however, during his fall from prominence, sought out ways in his 
personal and professional life to again be seen as an important individual. 
After Walker’s initial defection in 1967, he continued to provide the USSR with 
classified material until his arrest in 1985. As noted above, his personality and desire for 
prominence led him to defect and his continued acts of espionage can be seen as a persistence of 
this motivation until 1974. Walker, still in the Navy, befriended a naval enlisted member named 
Jerry Whitworth, his first recruit for the USSR. With the recruit of another service member, 
Walker was now able to continue his production of secure information after his retirement from 
the navy in 1976.150 However, this advancement in his defection activity, the persuasion and 
recruitment of other potential assets, demonstrates an evolution in his motivation. Walker’s 
recruitment didn’t stop at his friend, but went on to include his son, Michael, and older brother, 
Author. This evolution, while a continuation of various aspects of his personality to include an 
ability to manipulate other individuals and engaging in risky behavior, also encompasses the 
motivation to engage in the “game of espionage”, for the game’s sake. Walker’s motivational 
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transformation from a push, due to his personality, to a pull, of the “game of espionage”, is 
evidenced by his claims of engaging in his defection out of excitement and his claims that the 
behavior that he engaged in changed the world for the better, offering the USSR an advantage 
from which to negotiate arms treaties with the U.S.151 Walker’s motivation for defection, 
stemming from his psychopathic personality tendencies, excitement for the game of espionage, 
in conjunction with his desire and ability to recruit other assets to aid him in his defection, led 
him to be one of the most successful defectors in U.S. history. 
Much of the previous literature has helped inform John Walker’s motivation for 
defection. One prominent viewpoint came from Ursula Wilder, who concluded that Walker’s 
psychopathic personality’s contribution to his defection. However, one aspect that is 
unexplainable by previous research on defection is the prevalent role that money continued to 
play in the defection. Katherine Herbig’s research, supports this observation by concluding that 
money is the greatest motivating factor in leading to an individual’s defection,152 however, 
provides limited help beyond this observation. In supplanting the observations of Herbig, with 
the work of social psychologists, I have demonstrated that, for Walker, money plays a role 
beyond its physical purchasing ability.  
Money for Walker, while an external motivator, was interpreted as a status symbol; the 
more the USSR paid him, the more valuable he was to them. A second role that money played 
was the role that money played in allowing him to manipulate others into helping him in his 
defection. Money became a facilitator for him to engage in the game of espionage. Therefore, 
while money played a role in his defection, theoretical interpretation demonstrates what kind of 
																																																								
151 Wilder, “Psychology of Espionage,” 24; Sulick, American Spies, 93-107.  
152 Herbig, Changes in American Espionage: 1947-2007. 
   56 
role it played. Therefore, while Walker’s primary motivation for defection was his disordered 
personality, pushing him to seek out the game of espionage, exacerbated by his interpretation of 
money and its facilitating role.  
 
Robert Hanssen 
Over the course of his 35-year career at the FBI, Robert Hanssen served as a field agent, 
as a counter-intelligence agent, and an employee within the budget department. All of these 
positions gave him unfettered access to vital information about numerous cases, operatives 
working against the USSR (and after its collapse, Russia) and classified computer systems and 
encryption technology, all of which he sold to the USSR beginning in 1979 until his arrest in 
2001.153 Hanssen’s case, like that of John Walker, is supported by the conclusion that an 
individual’s personality predisposition plays a role in leading to an individual’s defection and is 
mitigated, or exacerbated, by one’s environment. The conclusions of the following case calls into 
question previous observations by sociologists that social bonds orients an individual’s actions 
along lines of established norms and that the government, while taking many steps in preventing 
defection through the separation and compartmentalization of information, in conjunction with 
an inherent trust in the selection process to obtain individuals adverse to defection, encumbered 
the combatting of Robert Hanssen’s defection.  
Robert Hanssen, born in 1944 in Chicago, was raised in an authoritative household was 
head by his father, which exposed him to ample levels of physical and emotional abuse directed 
at teaching Hanssen how to “be a man”.154 This led Hanssen to socially isolate himself from his 
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peers, like many other victims of child abuse.155 His childhood behavior was also characterized 
by risky behavior, such as racing his car, yet also isolationist behavior, such as reading in a 
secluded environment.156 Academically, Hanssen was an above average student who began 
dental school, yet ended dropped out to follow in his father’s footsteps as a police officer. Once 
in the Chicago Police Department, Hanssen was assigned to a special division, C-5, that 
conducted internal investigations.157 From here, he pursued employment within the intelligence 
community, failing to get picked up by the NSA in the early years of his career searching, 
eventually getting hired by the FBI in January of 1976.158 Hanssen eventually found himself in 
the New York field office in the White-Collar division, quickly being reassigned to the Soviet 
intelligence division (Division Three), where he ended up spending a significant amount of time 
working with FBI computer systems, granting him significant access to classified information, 
all within the first years of his employment.159 In 1979, three years after swearing allegiance to 
the FBI, Hanssen walked into an intermediary and delivered a message, under a false identity, 
that he had classified information that he wanted to sell to the USSR, the beginning of his 
defection.160 His defection activity would continue until his arrest in 2001, after he had 
compromised “numerous” human sources, “dozens” of classified government documents and 
programs, and “numerous” FBI counterintelligence procedures,161 along with a range other 
crimes outlined during his prosecution.  
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In the case of Robert Hanssen, it is assessed that the abuse that Hanssen received from his 
father played a role in directing him in the future; however, the degree to which it impacted his 
decision-making continues to be debated. One critical aspect influenced by an individual’s past is 
their personality. Hanssen exhibited numerous aspects of a psychopathic personality beginning at 
a young age. As a child, Hanssen isolated himself from his peers, engaged in risky behaviors to 
include racing and pursuing a career in law enforcement, and joining the intelligence community 
for the “excitement”.162 However, examples of his disordered personality continue to emerge 
throughout his life. The first is the constant reference to Hanssen’s inflated sense of self-worth, 
by his colleagues and peers,163 where in their critique of Hanssen, they saw him as an intelligent 
individual, yet found him difficult to work with because of his arrogance. A second example of 
his psychopathic tendencies is his belief that his intellectual prowess was being overlooked by 
the higher ups and that he was being underutilized.164 Both of these personality characteristics, in 
hindsight, demonstrate a predisposed to defection. 
During Hanssen’s defection, his psychopathic personality is more evident than the period 
prior to his defection. Throughout the 22 years that he sold information to the USSR, Hanssen 
operated under a number of aliases, including Ramon Garcia and Jim Baker.165 Working 
undercover provided Hanssen a sense of security allowing him to leverage USSR and impose his 
demands because of his position of power within the FBI and the sense of security that he 
created for himself by using aliases. A second aspect of his defection that demonstrates his 
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psychopathic tendencies is evidenced in his lying to his wife when caught spying on the FBI. In 
1980, Hanssen’s wife caught him with classified information, confronted him about it, and upon 
finding out the truth was promised that Hanssen would not continue his arrangement with the 
USSR. Hanssen would renege on this promise and continue to work for the USSR (and Later 
Russia) for another 20 years.166 Hanssen’s pre-defection and post-defection tendencies indicate 
strong the role that his personality played in his decision-making. However, Hanssen’s 
personality did not exist in a vacuum and was greatly influenced by his environment.  
One primary environmental factor identified in the life of Hanssen was his work at the 
FBI. Prior to his defection, Hanssen quickly rose within the FBI, yet perceived that he was 
continually passed over for more prestigious counterintelligence (CI) operations, increasing both 
a sense of of disillusionment with his coworkers and resentment towards his superiors for failing 
to recognize his abilities.167 Both of these factors provide an understand ding of the atmosphere 
that would lead Hanssen to defect, however, there is a lack of understanding as to what would 
lead to a jump from disgruntlement and lack of social bonds (to his workplace), to defecting.  
One avenue that would provide insight is in the challenge that Hanssen’s case poses to 
sociologists that claim that social bonds, to norm abiding institutions and one’s community, lead 
an individual to follow established norms. In Hanssen’s case, his established social bonds were 
to the church and Catholicism,168 a religion characterized by strict adherence to a moral code, 
which included acts such as his refusal of alcohol.169 Hanssen’s proclaimed religiosity, in light of 
his psychopathic tendencies, would suggest that his involvement with the church was merely a 
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façade. However, Eric O’ Neil, the FBI agent credited with obtaining Hanssen’s confession after 
months of uncover work getting to know Hanssen on an intimate level, along with most of those 
who interacted with Hanssen throughout his life, describe his religiosity as genuine.170 Therefore, 
in understanding the role that social bonds play, previous work would suggest that Hanssen 
would abide by the norms set forth by the church, to include: upholding his oaths that he made to 
the FBI to protect the U.S.; the oath he took, upon being granted access to classified information, 
that he would not divulge it to unauthorized personnel; and, on a personal level, keep his 
promises that he made to his wife, on multiple occasions, that he would stop spying against the 
U.S.  
In response to this puzzle, I pose that Hanssen was in fact following norm, albeit on a 
selective basis, to an all-consuming aspect of his life, his job. As previously iterated, much of the 
work of the intelligence community is shrouded in secrecy and, by virtue, lends to a loose 
interpretation of the truth. Therefore, I postulate that this dichotomy to two “masters” created an 
undeniable struggle within Hanssen, driving him to defect. The morals of the intelligence 
community, of lying and sometime more devious behavior, would seem counter to the culture of 
Catholicism, which is based in rejection of any and all sin. Therefore, I pose that the 
incorporation of Lydia Wilson’s application of reversal theory is appropriate. In this theory, a 
given situation determines a motivational state of mind by “switching” between domains, 
however, in a crisis, an inability to switch leads to defection.171 Therefore, I pose that Hanssen’s 
inability to traverse the motivational states, from the desire of rejection of sin to the desire to 
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engage in “intelligence activities”; in the face of the continual internal crisis of serving two 
masters; exacerbated by the stressful nature of his relatively new job within the intelligence 
community; coupled with his disgruntlement and disillusionment with his coworkers, led to his 
defection. This viewpoint, while seated in research, requires an incorporation of both theoretical 
research and defection studies to fully understand the implications and impact of Hanssen’s 
situation on his decision to defect. Absent either would have left one with the understanding that 
the disgruntlement or disillusionment alone would have led to his defection.  
Robert Hanssen’s case also presents a strong example of current deficits within the 
government’s efforts to prevent and detect defection. Near the end of Hanssen’s career, there 
were multiple instances where his behavior raised “red flags”, that his superiors overlooked or 
Hanssen was able to explain away without further investigation, allowing him to continue his 
activities for the USSR. One “flagrant” security breach was when Hanssen hack into the FBI 
system from a colleague’s computer and retrieve “sensitive” information about USSR agents and 
operations. He would go on to report what he had done to his superiors, claiming he did so to 
demonstrate vulnerabilities in the system.172 The FBI accepted this explanation without further 
inquiry. A second failure by the FBI to address security concerns is the failure to investigate 
Hanssen’s abnormal financial activity, reported by his brother in-law.173 
These examples of the failures of the FBI demonstrate two critical problems inherent in 
the government’s prevention and detection of defection. The first is that the process of defection 
prevention relies heavily on an individual obtaining a security clearance. While unable to 
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determine how many defectors the clearance process has stopped, it has created a sense of 
unquestionable trust in employees who have been successfully adjudicated. Trusting an 
employee is imperative in letting them fulfill their job, however, in situations, such as a security 
breach, that call into question an individual’s trustworthiness need to be investigated as if an 
individual, while presumed innocent, has the potential to be guilty of the charges. This leads to 
the second problem inherent with the current system, that individuals within the intelligence 
community must abide by the rules and procedures set in place to be able to prevent defection. 
This second problem will continue to be an inevitable part of combatting defection, regardless of 
the procedures put forward, because of the innate ability of humans to choose to engage in a 
behavior or not.  
Robert Hanssen, raised in a troubling household, sought out a career in the exciting field 
of the intelligence community, ultimately joining the FBI in 1976 where, three years later, he 
began a 22-year career of feeding classified intelligence to the USSR and Russia (RUS). The 
prevalence of his psychopathic tendencies influenced him to compromise national security. His 
case supports the previous conclusions by theorists and practitioners that personality plays an 
imperative role in an individual’s decision to defect. Hanssen’s case also demonstrated the 
paradoxical nature that social bonds create in an individual. On one hand, Hanssen had an 
inseparable devotion to the Catholic church, and on the other, an intense devotion to the game of 
espionage. I postulate that this internal conflict led to an inability to transition motivational states 
and ultimately, in conjunction with a sense of disgruntlement and disillusionment, to his 
defection. The study of Hanssen’s case also reveals two problems within current U.S. efforts to 
combat defection; an overreliance on the security adjudication process, leading to unquestioned 
trust in an individual, and the necessity for employees within the intelligence community to 
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abide by security procedures without deviation. In all, Hanssen’s case provides support for 
previous claims of the importance of personality in defection motivation and the utility of those 
focusing on motivation for defection; yet, reinforces that a theoretical lens was required to truly 
understand Hanssen’s motivation to defect. The U.S. government’s ability to prevent and detect 
Hanssen’s defection demonstrates that the current process is inherently flawed because of the 
innate characteristics of a human to rely on the security clearance process and their ability to 
make independent decisions in enforcing security procedures.  
 
Edward Howard 
 Prior to graduating from the CIA’s training school at Camp Peary, known as The Farm, 
Edward Howard had previously been denied employment at the CIA, worked for the Peace 
Corps, and completed a degree from American University.174 These experiences eventually led to 
his recruitment for the CIA’s Soviet division, a prestigious posting for an intelligence officer. 
However, prior to deploying, Howard failed a polygraph examination and in June 1983, after less 
than three years of employment, was fired from the CIA.175 While never deploying to a CIA field 
office, Howard was being groomed to deploy to the sensitive area and was privy to the classified 
information within the division. In late 1983 or fall of 1984 (the date of actual defection is 
unknown but speculated upon by Howard’s testimony and analysis of his travel around the times 
of alleged defection activity),176 after being fired from the CIA, Howard delivered classified 
information to the USSR, beginning his life as a defector. Howard’s delivery compromised 
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HUMINT sources the CIA had in place in the USSR and U.S. operating procedures when 
handling assets in denied areas of operation (such as the USSR).177 Howard’s defection was 
eventually discovered by the CIA, was the subject of an extensive FBI investigation, and fled the 
U.S., where he found refuge in the USSR until his death in 2002.  
Unlike the previous cases in this paper, Edward Howard did not defect to the USSR until 
a year after being fired from the CIA, yet his personality indicated a predisposition to defection 
before his employment. The primary aspects of Howard’s personality that were indicators were 
his drug usage and generally deviant behavior, including petty theft.178 Both of these deviant 
behaviors are examples of risk-seeking behavior, a sub-threshold symptom of personality 
disorders. In the case of Howard, these predisposing personality characteristics, evaluated from 
the perspective of Lydia Wilson’s reversal theory, provide a more comprehensive understanding 
of his defection.  
Howard’s failure of his polygraph examination, and subsequent firing from the CIA, is 
the second rejection Howard received from the CIA and is the triggering event that set his 
defection in motion. Howard was first rejected from the CIA when his application for 
employment was turned down, resulting in him employment with the Peace Corp and then 
USAID.179 Instead of responding in similar fashion to his second rejection from the CIA, 
Howard deviated from conventional norms and defected to the USSR. Reversal theory sheds 
light on the divergent results by proposing, first, that Howard’s response was different because 
they were different situations. Howard’s first rejection was from seeking employment, while his 
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firing was after he was already an employee with an invested interest. The second proposition 
postulates that since Howard was actively engaged in disordered behavior, excessive drinking, 
when he was fired it prevented him from utilizing effective coping mechanisms and prevented 
him from “switching” across motivational states, leaving him unable to manage with the stress of 
the personal crisis in a positive manner. To fill the void of the positive coping mechanisms, 
Howard turned to defection as a way to handle his firing from the CIA.180 Therefore, the 
difference in Howard’s reaction to the rejections is the result of the divergent circumstances 
leading to differing motivating factors and perceived options moving forward.  
A second aspect of Edward Howard’s motivation for defection to be evaluated are his 
overt claims of disgruntlement. After his firing, many of Howard’s colleagues noted his anger 
towards the CIA for their “mistreatment” and perceived injustices towards him.181 The claims of 
Howard are neither unfounded nor rare. Katherine Herbig’s work concluded that a prominent 
reason for defection within the intelligence community is disgruntlement with the employing 
agency.182 However, her observations, without additional input from other authors, would merely 
claim that disgruntlement was the primary reason for defection. This generalization leaves out 
the critical factor of Howard’s ability to shift motivational states. Previously he was displeased 
by his rejection from the CIA, yet did not turn to destructive behavior. Therefore, the inclusion 
of the observations of reversal theory are imperative. Therefore, I assess that Howard defected to 
the USSR because of disgruntlement arising from his personal crisis of being rejected (fired) by 
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the CIA; set in the context of being an employee engaging in deviant behavior and drug usage 
and an inability to cope with the triggering event, and thus unable to shift motivational states. 
Numerous aspects of Howard’s case give rise to an assessment that the U.S. government 
made three major failures when handling the case of Howard. The first is the failure to detect 
Howard’s predisposition for defection in the first place. The CIA identified him as an “ideal” 
candidate as an intelligence officer based on numerous qualifications such as having a graduate 
degree, knowing three languages, and the possession of a security clearance (issued by 
USAID).183 While “on paper” Howard was an ideal candidate, his questioning in the security 
process, along with the questioning of his family, friends, and colleagues, demonstrated that he 
was not forthcoming with his past history, specifically drug usage and deviant behavior, an 
immediately disqualifying factor within the security clearance process. However, the failures of 
the CIA’s ability to appropriately evaluate Howard’s past allowed him to made it through the 
process, placing him in a role with access to classified information and operating procedures. 
Once learning of Howard’s ineptitude of working for the CIA as an intelligence officer, through 
conducting a polygraph prior to his deployment to the USSR, they fired him, leading to their 
second failure in preventing his defection. 
The second failure in preventing defection is the way in which the CIA handled the 
dismissal of Howard. Prior to his firing, the CIA gave Howard multiple chances to work through 
his drug usage, retake his polygraph tests, and sought to pay for his counseling services (months 
after his separation from the agency),184 taking many precautions and steps to ensure a fair and 
																																																								
183 Edward Howard, Safe House: The Compelling Memoires of the Only CIA Spy to Seek Asylum 
in Russia, ed. Richard Coté (Bethesda, MD: National Press Books, 1995), 33-36.  
184 Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final 
Showdown with the KGB (New York: Random House Publishing, 2003), 82-87. 
   67 
dignified exit process for Howard. However, Howard perceived their actions, and his firing as 
unjust and unwarranted. Regardless of the CIA’s attempts to establish a relatively amicable 
separation moving forward, Howard’s perception of the events, whether true or not, led to his 
disgruntlement with his former employer and ultimately his defection. The failure of the CIA in 
the dismissal of Howard is not in the appropriate measures they took in the separation process, 
but in their failure to take additional precautionary measure. One of the primary measures absent, 
in the immediate aftermath of the firing, was the need to evaluate Howard’s mental status.185 If 
the CIA were to have evaluated Howard’s mental status, they would have determined that he was 
resentful and unable to cope with the separation, and would have either needed to detain him, 
limit his foreign contact, or keep watch over his activities for a set period, to better protect the 
classified information Howard left the CIA with. One tool at the disposal of the CIA that would 
have enabled them to keep tabs on Howard’s activity, after he left the agency, is the use of the 
FBI and their domestic law enforcement capabilities.  
The third failure the CIA made was the failure to inform the FBI about their separation 
with a potentially damaging former employee. If informed, the FBI would have been able to 
keep watch over Howard and his activities for a period of time to verify that he was not seeking 
to defect. A second advantage of notifying the FBI would have enabled them to build a stronger 
case against Howard early on, enabling them to arrest him. The CIA did not reveal their 
dismissal or concerns to the FBI about Howard until late 1985 upon receiving a USSR defector 
that pointed to Howard as having defected to the USSR.186 Upon learning of his potential 
defection, the FBI launched an investigation into Howard, forcing them to gather a significant 
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amount of information on him in a short period of time to offset the last year and a half of 
inaction in working against him. Howard, a trained CIA intelligence officer, noticing the 
increased attention being paid to his activities tipped him off to the FBI investigation into his 
defection.187 Upon recruiting his wife to evade further investigation and arrest, Howard planned 
an escape using the tradecraft the CIA had taught him, which allowed him to lose his FBI 
surveillance, leave the U.S., and make his way to the USSR, where he established himself as the 
first CIA officer to publicly defect to the USSR.188  
Edward Howard’s defection was the result of his predisposition to defect, a triggering 
event (his firing), encumbered by an inability to shift motivational states, and failures of the CIA 
to effectively combat defection. Without all of these components, Howard’s defection would not 
have been possible. The initial failure in the investigation of Howard’s past granted him access to 
classified information, which led to Howard’s dismissal when administered another polygraph, 
revealing the inaccuracy of the previous investigation. The CIA then followed appropriate 
protocol, attempting to dismiss Howard on the most amicable terms possible. However, Howard, 
now armed with classified information and procedures and unable to cope with being rejected by 
the CIA a second time, defected to the USSR because of the perceived injustices he felt at the 
hands of the CIA. The CIA, failing to understand Howard’s true motivational and mental state, 
did not inform additional agencies that could have helped keep tabs on Howard and his actions, 
which allowed Howard to engage in his defection without scrutiny. The failures of the CIA set in 
motion a chain of events that forced the FBI to expedite their investigation, tipping off a trained 
CIA officer, allowing Howard to flee the U.S. and seek asylum in the USSR.  
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Ana Montes 
 After the September 11th terrorist attacks, the FBI arrested a top level Cuban analyst 
working for the DIA, Ana Montes, as a result of an extensive investigation, revealing that she 
had spent her career at the DIA as a “mole” for Cuba.189 After beginning a career at the DIA in 
1985, Montes worked with Cuban intelligence officers as a defector, where in the following 16 
years, until her arrest in September 2001, she became a leading expert within the U.S. 
intelligence community on Cuba, influenced the U.S. government’s understanding of Cuba, and 
compromised multiple intelligence officers working undercover in Cuba.190  
 Ana Montes was sought out by the Cuban intelligence service (G2), while she was 
working for the Department of Justice (DOJ), where late 1984, she was recruited and defected to 
Cuba, prior to her employment with the DIA.191 Like many of the past cases discussed, her 
predisposition is seated in her past experiences. Beginning in Montes’s childhood, she was 
surrounded by diversity and views that opposed U.S. policy. She was born in Germany, to a U.S. 
army officer of Puerto Rican dissent, who was vocal of his support for Puerto Rican 
independence from the U.S.; was raised throughout the U.S., moving frequently because of her 
father’s job; and frequently traveled to Puerto Rico to visit family. 192 The Montes children, Ana 
and her younger brother and sister, while members of a proud Puerto Rican family, were 
prevented from speaking Spanish at home, yet Ana Montes was still successful in developing her 
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Spanish-speaking abilities, eventually attaining a near-native level. She would go on to attend the 
University of Virginia (UVA) for her undergraduate degree, studying abroad in Puerto Rico and 
Spain, where she began to speak publicly about her disagreements with U.S. policy towards 
Latin American countries (LAC).193 After graduating from UVA, she was offered a job working 
for the DOJ, attained a Top Secret security clearance, and completed her master’s program at 
John’s Hopkins University, all while continuing to publicly disagree with U.S. policy towards 
LAC. Late 1984, while still working for the DOJ, Montes was pitched and recruited by the G2,194 
beginning her life as a defector. Shortly after her recruitment, Montes was accepted to the DIA as 
an analyst, where she would continue to work, and spy for the G2, for the next 16 years, until her 
arrest in 2001.195  
 Montes was identified as a potential defector by the G2 based on her public objections to 
U.S. LAC policy, however, her successful recruitment is explained by evaluating the interaction 
of Albert Bandura’s Social Learning Theory (SLT) with the tools of MICE and RASCLS, 
leading to the conclusion that she defected for ideological reasons. These observations are further 
supported by the variables surrounding her continued actions against the U.S. and DIA. The first 
component to Montes’s defection is her predisposition, where, from a young age, she was 
encouraged to question and disagree with U.S. policy, the beginnings of her divergence with 
U.S. ideology. Bandura’s SLT postulates that individuals learn by watching others and that the 
individual is likely to emulate the behavior when closely identifying with the mimicked 
individual.196 In the case of Ana Montes, she learned at a young age from her father, a prominent 
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figure in her life, that questioning the policies of the U.S., specifically when dealing with LAC, 
is a viable option. This lesson was internalized, and eventually materialized in college, when she 
began to spend more time in foreign countries during study abroad semesters, and therefore, by 
the time she was pitched in late 1984, Montes had a firm belief in her ability to question U.S. 
policies. In identifying that Montes had multiple factors that would lead to a successful defector, 
the G2 used the tools of MICE and RASCLS to recruit her. 
 The “I” in MICE stands for ideology, one of the foundational motivating factors that lead 
an individual to act. While in this case, it is evident that Montes held ideological differences with 
U.S. LAC policy, it is not clear that these differences alone would have led to her defection. The 
fact that Montes did not seek out Cuban intelligence officials to defect is a critical variable in 
assessing Montes’s willingness to defect on ideology alone. A second piece of evidence emerges 
during an interview with the counterintelligence (CI) agent, that investigated her for espionage 
activity later in her career, stating that disagreement does not necessarily mean disloyalty.197 
While she was engaged in defection at the time of the statement, it brings to light that her 
defection was the result of internal conflict between her ideological differences being influenced 
by something more. This leads to the conclusion that Montes’s defection in unable to be 
explained solely by a predisposed to ideological differences, demonstrated by SLT, and the 
application of MICE. 
The incomplete analysis of Montes’s motivation for defection by SLT and MICE, 
requires the use of RASCLS to be used to lead to a full understanding of Montes’s transition 
from ideological differences to defector. RASCLS focuses on the way in which an intelligence 
officer is able to manipulate an individual’s potential predisposing factors, inciting them to 
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defect.198 RASCLS involves establishing interpersonal relationships with assets and 
manipulating those relationships to play to the assets’ predispositions. In the case of Ana Montes, 
the G2 would have connected with Montes on the mutual agreement that U.S. involvement in the 
LAC was hurting the countries; on Montes’s strong Puerto Rican heritage; and the use of 
Spanish. Playing on these factors would have allowed the G2 to persuaded Montes that the best 
way to help the LAC, and subsequently “her people”, was to defect to Cuba by spying on the 
U.S. from within the DIA.199 Therefore, understanding Montes’ defection requires the use of 
SLT, which demonstrates that she was predisposition to ideological differences, and that 
acceptance that G2 used RASCLS to emboldened and exploited Montes predisposition. Absent 
either of these factors would have potentially led Montes down a path of disagreement, not 
disloyalty. 
 At the hands of the G2, Ana Montes’s ideological differences were manipulated, coercing 
her defection. However, the U.S. government failed to identify her as a defector until an 
investigation into her potential espionage activities beginning in 2000.200 The DIA had multiple 
shortcomings when handling Ana Montes. The first was their insufficient in-processing 
procedures. Unlike the CIA and NSA, at the time, the DIA did not use polygraph examinations 
in determining the validity of an applicant’s claims during the adjudication process.201 Montes’s 
security reviews consisted of in-person interviews and the interviewing of references, which 
were later demonstrated to be riddled with inaccuracies. Throughout follow-up security 
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interviews during her career, Montes revealed on multiple occasions that she had not been 
completely truthful during her pre-employment screening.202 These continual revelations are the 
second failure of the DIA, overlooking Montes’s lies by not further investigating the falsified 
information, permitting her to maintain access to classified information. This failure, previously 
discussed in the cases above is identified as the inherent flaw that human beings are given a 
choice to act or not on the established procedures.  
A final flaw can be identified as the agency’s reliance on their biases to understanding 
defection and the way it is conducted. The first component of the failure due to biases is 
evidenced in an investigation, early in Montes’s career, in response to reports from a coworker 
that was concerned that she was a defector. Some of the accepted “red flags” that were absent, 
preventing the investigator from further investigating, were: 1) She was not a male; 2) Her 
financial situation remained unchanged; 3) She had already previously been investigated and 
granted a TS/SCI security clearance; and the “trump card”, 4) She had passed a polygraph 
examination in the course of the CI investigation.203 While these are all factors that have been 
variables in the defection of individuals in the past and must be taken into consideration when 
evaluating a case for the potential for defection, the DIA’s overreliance on them hindered its 
ability to identify Montes as a defector earlier in her career. The second bias present was the 
DIA’s understanding of the way that an individual collected classified information to be 
disseminated to their country of defection. All the previous cases analyzed saw the defector 
retrieve information from their work, remove it from the facility, and then transfer it to their 
handlers. Montes’s defection proved unique because she never removed information from the 
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building, instead, she memorized it, upon returning home, typed it up on her home computer, and 
then transferred it to her handlers.204 This process allowed her to disseminate classified 
information without ever having the possibility of being caught “red handed” until the point she 
would type it up in the privacy of her home, allowing her to remain undetected for 16 years.  
A final conclusion to be drawn from the U.S. government’s biases leads to a deeper 
conversation that is highlighted by the overall case of Ana Montes. Montes’s defection was 
characterized by novelty, an ability to evade detection, and an ability to effectively live a double 
life, critical skills for an intelligence officer when operating against other countries, but 
incredibly dangerous to one’s home country. This dilemma, posed by training highly skilled and 
intelligent individuals in the art of deception and manipulation, is an inseparable part of running 
an effective intelligence agency. Without trained and skilled individuals, an intelligence agency 
would be unable to collect information on targets, thus making them irrelevant; therefore, by 
creating a strong intelligence agency, with highly skilled and intelligence officers, a government 
is sowing the seeds to its own destruction.  
 By incorporating theoretical understanding of motivation and research directed at 
motivation for defection, an evaluation of the case of Ana Montes’s defection demonstrated that 
she was raised to questions U.S. foreign policy at a young age, which predisposed her to 
ideological divergence with the U.S. Throughout her college years, becoming more vocal about 
these differences, broadcast her potential to defect along ideological lines to the G2. Montes’ 
differences were soon exploited by the G2’s use of RASCLS. However, the U.S. government 
failed to adequately prevent a potential defector from accessing classified information, and 
would later allow their biases to prevent them detecting the defection for 16 years. In concluding, 
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the case of Montes seeks to communicates a paradox that exists today in that it is necessary to 
train skilled and intelligent individuals to build and operate effective intelligence agencies, yet in 
doing so, states are sowing seeds that could lead to their own destruction, if those individuals are 
turned against the state.  
 
Aldrich Ames 
 The final case investigated in this section is the case of Aldrich Ames, who many deem 
as the most damaging spy in U.S. history.205 Ames, was a CIA officer working with the CIA’s 
counter intelligence unit focusing on countering Soviet (and later Russian) intelligence 
operations, handling cases of Soviet defectors, and the running of operations that required critical 
insights into Soviet assets. In 1985, 18 years after he started his career at the CIA, Ames began 
spying on the U.S. for the USSR and Russia by selling the identity of numerous intelligence 
assets, which led to many of their executions; various CIA methods of tracking USSR agents and 
officers; and CIA methods for handling and communicating with assets inside the “denied” 
USSR.206 Ames was eventually arrested in 1994, nine years after his defection began where he 
was paid $2.7 million by the USSR, the highest paid U.S. spy to date.207  
 The first aspect of the case of Aldrich Ames’ defection that contributes to an 
understanding of his motivation for defection is the role that an individual’s disordered 
personality traits play in predisposing an individual to defection. Past research and conclusions 
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have already been discussed and evaluated in the previous cases of John Walker, Robert 
Hanssen, and Edward Howard, demonstrating this as defining component of motivation for 
defection. In the case of Ames, his predisposed personality is evident through the critical 
example of his deviant behavior. Ames, like all other CIA employees took a polygraph as a 
precondition for employment, where he confessed that he engaged in sub-threshold alcoholic 
behavior and criminal behavior to include stealing a bicycle.208 While Ames’ alcohol abuse 
demonstrated a prevalence of disordered personality traits, his breaking of policies and 
regulations built upon further highlight this initial observation. With the disordered behaviors of 
alcohol abuse and thievery admitted to the CIA, and overlooked to allow Ames to continue his 
employment, his deviant behavior became more significant throughout his career, taking the 
form of continued (and worsening) alcohol abuse and failing to abide by CIA policies and 
regulations. One of the various rules broken by Ames was the need to divulge a change in 
relationship status, especially when the relationship involves someone of foreign nationality.  
Beginning in 1981, Ames and his wife, an American, began to experience marital 
troubles and were divorced in 1985.209 However, during this time, Ames, working in Mexico, 
had recruited an agent, named Maridel Rosario Casas Dupuy (Rosario) and began an intimate 
relationship with her all without the CIA’s knowledge, a security violation.210 Approximately a 
month after his divorce and prolonged relationship with Rosario, Ames informed he CIA of his 
current intimate relationship status, marrying Rosario. With this security violation behind him, 
Ames would go on to violate another CIA policy by opening significant lines of credit that he 
																																																								
208 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, An Assessment of the Aldrich H. 
Ames Espionage Case and Its Implications for U.S Intelligence, November 1, 1994, Stock 
Number 052-070-069-77-5, https://fas.org/irp/congress/1994_rpt/ssci_ames.htm.  
209 Trahair and Miller, Cold War Espionage, 11-14.  
210 Ibid.  
   77 
was unable to pay back.211 The noted behavior of Ames’ overextension of his credit line plays a 
significant role in his motivation on two fronts, financial incentives (in and of themselves) and 
divergent loyalties. The significance of the debt that Ames faced cannot be understated leads an 
individual to seek out a means to satisfy their financial requirements. In Aldrich Ames’ case, his 
financial needs helped drive him to walk into the Soviet embassy in April of 1985 and defect to 
the USSR, by supplying them with the names of Soviet assets run by the CIA, in return for 
$50,000.212 He would continue to be paid immense sums of money in the form of cash and 
credit, in an off-shore account, in return for his activities.  
 Ames’ alcoholism, breaking of security protocol, and selling of U.S. secrets, while all 
deviant behavior, are on a spectrum of severity, with the selling of U.S. secrets being the most 
severe. This observation brings forward the question of, all other factors being constant, how can 
one’s deviant behavior escalate from something relatively minor to an extreme of selling state 
secrets? One explanation is that Ames had an underdeveloped personality that prevented him 
from coping with the stresses of the financial hardships, leading him to turn to increasingly more 
deviant behavior, and ultimately defection. However, the viability of this proposition is called 
into question because of Ames’ ability to effectively navigate situations of varying stress levels 
and difficult situations, exemplified throughout his first 18 years as a CIA intelligence officer.  
 A second explanation stems from Ames’ divergent loyalties. Many authors claim that 
Ames’ motives were strictly financial,213 however, the motivation that led to his financial 
situation is a motivating factor in itself. Ames’ deviant behavior of overextension of his credit 
lines and his compromised financial situation emerged from his divorce and relationship with 
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Rosario. The divorce from his ex-wife left him with a set of payments to satisfy; however, his 
divorce ran concurrently his expanding relationship with Rosario that had evolved to marriage, 
leading her to move to Washington D.C. with him and live the lavish lifestyle Ames had implied 
that he could provide her.214 As a result of Rosario being misled about his true financial situation, 
Ames’ was unable to keep up with the new expenses, and instead of limiting the expenses and 
divulging his true situation, Ames sought to appease Rosario by financially overextending 
himself. Following the cause of the financial problem that influenced Ames actions, 
demonstrates that the financial incentive to defect was in fact a symptom of divergent loyalties 
between his commitment to the CIA, and the national security of the U.S., and his desire to 
appease Rosario. Like the previous case of Ana Montes, Ames chose to remain loyal to a cause 
other than the U.S.  
 Unlike the case of Ana Montes, Ames’ divergent loyalties are unable to fully explain 
Ames’ motivation for defection. It fails to answer the questions of why he continued to engage in 
increasingly more deviant behavior, from alcoholism and minor thievery to defection; why he 
did not simply abandon his lies to Rosario in the face of increasingly more difficult financial 
situations, when he had proven himself to effectively navigate difficult situations before; and 
why he continued to engage in increasingly more dangerous espionage activities in support of the 
USSR. These questions, unable to be answered by previous conclusions of the motivating factors 
of financial motivation, personality disorders, or divergent loyalties, can be explained by an 
incorporation and application of the ideas of SOEC.  
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 SOEC is the analysis that the more that an individual has invested in a situation (or 
outcome) the more likely that individual is to increasingly invest in it.215 This leads to the 
expectation that once an individual has ventured on a path, they will maintain that path, 
destructive or not, until something removes them from their course of action. In the case of 
Ames, an individual with a complex set of motivating behaviors, SOEC illuminates the gap 
between the deviant behavior, divergent loyalties, and his defection. Beginning with his minor 
thievery Ames had set himself up to continue his deviant behavior by failing to fully disclosing 
the nature of his alcohol abuse on a polygraph to the CIA. He speculated that if he had revealed 
the full extent of his behavior, he would be denied employment, and therefore lied. The second 
scenario that SOEC explains the continued decent of Ames involves his time in Mexico. Once in 
Mexico, Ames began “running” and developed an intimate relationship with Rosario, the agent. 
This relationship began under the pretexts of Ames’ lavish lifestyle he was able to provide an 
informant, however, once their intimate relationship began, Ames was unable to reveal his true 
financial status. Once married, an inability to deviate from the path of lies that he had chosen to 
keep telling Rosario, led him to seek out lines of credit that he was unable to maintain. 
Therefore, at this point, SOEC helps explain Ames’ descent from a mediocre employee with 
deviant tendencies,216 to an individual that was on an increasingly exacerbated path between the 
truth and deviance. This path led Ames to have a stake in keeping Rosario financially appeased, 
yet without money. He simultaneously became more deviant throughout his career as a CIA 
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officer, from minor thievery, to drug abuse, to breaking security protocol. His early career saw 
his descent on an individual level, personal level (at home), and professional level (with the 
CIA). This continual path of deviance and lies, coupled with an innate instinct to obtain the basic 
necessities of life (he would fail to have if he wasn’t able to pay back his overextended credit), 
led Ames to assume that the only logical next step was defection.  
While SOEC helps explain the interconnectivity between the increasingly deviant 
behaviors, the role that divergent loyalty (between Rosario and the CIA), and his financial 
struggles contributed to his defection, SOEC alongside the understanding of current legislation 
and policy provides a viable explanation for his continued defection. As soon as Ames offered 
information to the USSR, he committed a felony. U.S. law deems it illegal to pass any kind of 
classified information to “unauthorized persons”, resulting in a harsh prison sentence if 
convicted.217 While the U.S. judicial system allows prosecution discrepancy when bring a case 
forward, there is little that an individual could do to avoid a prison term, and thus begins another 
cycle of SOEC. At the point of his defection, Ames was presented with three primary options: 1) 
Stop spying and continue with his life as normal; 2) Tell the CIA, take the punishment, and hope 
for leniency; or 3) Continue to spy. Absent additional variables, the first two options seem viable 
options. However, three primary considerations must be taken into account. The first is that 
Ames has already begun down a path of deviance, lies, and loyalty to Rosario. A confession 
would lead to the loss of his job, freedom, and his family, making this an unviable option. A 
second consideration that must be taken into account is the nature of information that Ames gave 
the Soviets. He delivered the names of agents that the CIA was running in the USSR. This 
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information, extremely valuable to the USSR and detrimental to CIA operations, would prove 
fatal to many of those on the list.218 The execution of the individuals on the list would pose a 
problem to Ames, because it would raise flags with the CIA, alerting to a potential compromise 
within the agency. The internal hunt for a mole would make going about life “as usual” and 
forgetting about the defection activity unlikely.  
The final consideration that must be taken into account when determining whether Ames 
would continue his defection activity or not is that fact that he had already sold secrets, and 
therefore individuals within the USSR would be able to oust him as a spy. This is a critical 
component on two fronts. First, if he stopped selling secrets, the USSR would have no incentive 
to protect his identity from his initial compromise of the CIA. The second is that, if Ames’ 
continued to spy for the USSR he would be able to point the USSR in the direction of individuals 
that had defected to the U.S. (from the USSR) that could lead to the uncovering of his defection. 
The combination of the three considerations when choosing his next steps would have led Ames 
to choose the option to keep spying for the USSR, and thus fulfill the need to continue to invest 
more heavily into his defection.  
This thorough investigation of the defection of Aldrich Ames leads to the conclusion that 
his defection was the result of divergent loyalties, that resulted in his financial overextension, 
and subsequent need for financial assistance. Aiding in furthering an understanding of Ames’ 
actions is the theoretical framework SOEC, which provides valuable insight into the way in 
which his actions deteriorated from minor deviant behavior to something as extreme as 
defection. SOEC also helps explain why, once Ames was able to pacify the financial motivating 
factor, he would continue his defection. In all, an analysis of the case of Ames, while supporting 
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the observations of those focusing their research on motivation for defection, is incomplete 
without the incorporation of a theoretical framework from which to understand his financial need 
and his defection activity. 
 The previous chapter analyzed the cases of defection of John Walker, Robert Hanssen, 
Edward Howard, Ana Montes, and Aldrich Ames to demonstrate the successes and failures of 
previous research in determining motivation for defection among individual in the intelligence 
community; the successes and failures of current governmental efforts in combating defection 
within the intelligence community; and to discuss whether alternatives to the chosen approaches 
posed any more viable in being able to determine or prevent the defection of a given case.  
 While a complete analysis will be presented in Chapter 5, there are a few observations 
worth noting in the conclusion of this chapter. First, the predominant motivating factors that led 
to defection, in the identified cases were: an individual’s predisposition to react negatively to a 
stressful situation, an inclination to engage in deviant behavior, or sub-threshold personality 
defects; divergent loyalties, whether to another country or separate cause; discontent with the 
agency they were working for; and the inclusion of financial incentives. Secondly, observations 
from those focusing on motivation for defection within the intelligence community were able to 
effectively “classify” an individual’s motivation into a general category, however, the use of a 
theoretical framework was required to truly understanding what motivated an individual to 
defect. Additionally, as a result of defection research’s reliance on motivational theory posed by 
psychologists, sociologists, and social psychologists, understanding the motivation of an 
individual required hindsight and applying of a theory to the defection, as opposed to attempting 
to explain a defection via theory. In all, these critiques, expanded upon later, highlight the 
difficulty that the U.S. government has in developing policies to prevent and detect defection, 
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when those studying defection are unable to assess motivation without hindsight or a theoretical 
evaluation of what motivates an individual to defect. 
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CHAPTER 5 
A CRITIQUE, THE INEVITABLE, AND A WAY FORWARD 
 In this chapter, I bring together the previously presented research, in light of applying it 
to five cases of defection. I first pose a critique of the current approaches taken towards studying 
motivation for defection within the intelligence community. Secondly, this chapter focuses on 
the ways theoretical and directed research on motivation have influenced and directed the 
government’s ability to prevent and detect defection within the intelligence community. Thirdly, 
I highlight the numerous factors that will continue to influence assessing an individual’s 
motivation to defect and the ability to combat that defection. Finally, this chapter concludes with 
an assessment of how to move forward to better evaluate motivation for defection within the 
intelligence community, which would provide a more effective strategy to combat defection, and 
propositions for the future direction of motivational studies directed at analyzing defection 
within the intelligence community. 
 
The Study of Motivation for Defection Within the Intelligence Community 
 The previous work on motivation, discussed at length in Chapter 3, began with an 
analysis of the theoretical development on the factors surround motivation. The study of the 
reason for an individual’s actions stemmed from a curiosity to better understand the “why”, 
which eventually saw the fields of psychological and sociological evolve concurrently. 
Psychologists’ view on motivation continually changed and expanded based on ever-developing 
technological advances and understandings of the workings of an individual and their cognitive 
processes. Sociologists adapted their theories based on the confirmation or refutation of their 
previous conclusions, the changing dynamics in society, and the differences in social or cultural 
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values. Eventually both fields have acknowledged the importance that both, the cognitive 
processes of an individual and the environmental conditions, play in defining an individual’s 
motivation, leading to the predominance of social psychology as the forerunner in motivational 
studies.  
 This theoretical foundation, laid out by social psychologists, dictated to those who have 
focused on the question of, “What motivates an individual, within the intelligence community, to 
defect?”, the role that internal and external processes play in motivating an individual. In 
response, their research, focusing on motivation for defection within the intelligence community, 
effectively established generalized categories of motivators that lead to defection, such as: 
personality disposition, money, divergent loyalties, and disgruntlement. However, while their 
research proved to be an effective tool to leverage an individual’s potential predisposition and 
help explain an individual’s motivation, it was ineffective in demonstrating the underlying 
causes and motivators of their defection. This observation leads to two primary critiques. 
 The first critique is that the simplification of motivation to financially motivated, 
divergent loyalties, personality predisposition, or disgruntlement, leads to an inability to truly 
understand an individual’s motivation to defect. The categories mentioned above are broad and 
can include a number of underlying motivations that ultimately lead to the conclusion of the all-
encompassing “category” provided by the tool. Multiple examples of underlying motivations 
were demonstrated in Chapter 4, and include, an individual seeking money to fulfill financial 
obligations, such as paying off a debt; increasing one’s social status among their friends, family, 
   86 
and or peers;219 or the perception that getting paid was a sign of respect.220 The examples 
provided in Chapter 4, and briefly recapped here, demonstrate the variety of factors that could 
lead an individual to be categorized as having a financially motivated defection, highlighting 
how the simplification of an individual’s motivation to one word, such as money, is inadequate 
to describe the complexity of motivational factors that compel an individual to act.  
 A second, and more profound, critique is the lack of theoretical development taking place 
within the evolution of the study of motivation for defection. This is evident when looking to the 
evolution of the study of motivation put forward by the fields of psychology, sociology, and 
social psychology compared to the evolution of research directed at defection. The developments 
within the theoretical fields were brought about by conflicting ideas that had to demonstrate that 
previous observations were inadequate and that the new perspective more accurately described 
motivation, following a process outlined in Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions.221 While the directed research for the study of motivation for defection within the 
intelligence community is informed by the theoretical developments of social psychology, it fails 
to follow a similar evolutionary tradgectory. This failure to evolve has left the directed research 
absent a theoretical foundation, evidenced in Katherine Herbig’s big-data analytical approach, 
which provides the reader with a vast amount of information merely communicates the ways in 
which an individual’s defection is classified (money, ideology, etc.).222 It does not lend to 
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predictions of why the selected individuals that defected did, while others, who were confronted 
with similar situations, did not.  
 This lack of theoretical development is also seen in the proposal of the tool of MICE. 
When looking to this tool, practitioners identify that these are five common themes that can 
potentially lead an individual to defect. However, it is unable to determine an individual’s true 
motivation, as previously seen in the example of financial motivation. This lends to an inability 
to effectively determine if the motivation being leveraged by the intelligence officer is actually 
acting upon an individual’s motivation to defect or a “symptom” of an individual’s true 
motivation. A final component to emphasize the lack of theoretical development in the directed 
research is Allen Dulles describing the running of spies as an art.223 Therefore the use of the 
conclusions drawn by researchers is a means to help the “artists” (intelligence officer) complete 
their job of recruiting agents. This statement by Dulles shows that those looking into motivation 
for defection within the intelligence community are not seeking answers to an individual’s 
motivation to defect, but are seeking to provide intelligence officers with the most streamlined 
knowledge to most effectively convince an individual to defect.  
 By tailoring their work to aid in the recruitment of agents, and not for the deeper 
understanding of the motivation of the defector, those studying motivation for defection within 
the intelligence community have reduced the complex phenomena of motivation to simplistic 
categories that were only able to provide an analysis of general symptoms of an individual’s true 
motivations. These categories failed to advance an understanding of motivation when applied in 
Chapter 4, necessitating the use of various theoretical perspectives to further understand the case 
at hand. Ultimately, the conclusions of this section lead to the assessment that those currently 
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studying motivation of defection are not looking at motivation for defection, but at how to 
provide intelligence officers a framework and basic outline of potential predispositions of an 
individual that could be leveraged to coerce defection. Frameworks and tools, that as previously 
demonstrated, are ineffective in determining an individual’s true motivation, even with the 
benefit of hindsight. 
 
Research Guiding Governmental Efforts to Prevent and Detect Defection 
 One key role of the intelligence community, continually noted throughout the work, is the 
protection of national and international security, as well as the protection of one’s own secrets. 
To protect the U.S.’ information from being exploited via intelligence officers from foreign 
countries, the U.S. government has implemented a number of programs and procedures to 
prevent and detect defection by acting across the 3 phases of an individual’s career: pre-
employment, employment, and post-employment. While the true effectiveness of these 
procedures will never be truly known because of the classification of the information and the 
overall inability to know how many people have actually defected, unclassified evidence provide 
insight that at least some of the steps taken by the U.S. government have been effective in 
mitigating defection. 
One area where U.S. government employs a significant amount of resources to counter 
defection is in their pre-employment procedure. The adjudication process is centered on 
preventing individuals with a predisposition from accessing classified information by requiring 
an individual to obtain a security clearance through a rigorous verification process. Ursula 
Wilder iterates that this is a critical component because, without access to information, an 
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individual is unable to defect.224 A second aspect influencing the government’s anti-defection 
measures result from the conclusion, drawn by directed research on motivation for defection, that 
money, divergent loyalties, and personality predisposition are the primary contributing factors 
that contribute to an individual’s defection.225 In attempting to counter these factors, the 
government has developed and implemented programs during an individual’s employment and 
post-employment, which focus on fostering a deeper connection, and loyalty, to one’s 
community (both the intelligence community and the community they live in); financial 
assistance through programs such as tuition reimbursement; and the suppression of the 
dissemination of classified information. While many of these programs seek to create a “win-
win” situation, the government is willing to take extraordinary measures to protect its national 
interests.226 
In all, the U.S. government has developed plans of action and mitigation techniques, 
drawn from the conclusions those researching motivation for defection within the intelligence 
community, in enacting policies and procedures aimed at preventing and detecting defection 
within the intelligence community. However, as previously assessed, those that have been 
directing their research on motivation for defection within the intelligence community have 
actually been evaluating broad frameworks and a basic outline of potential aspects of an 
individual’s motivational predisposition that could be leveraged to coerce defection. Therefore, 
while the government’s policies have been informed by research, their actions, like those 
conducting directed research, is limited to the superficial components of an individual’s 
motivation. This problem of superficial fixation fails to account for more complex motivational 
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states that the previous case studies revealed. One egregious example of this is outlined in the 
case study of Aldrich Ames. In the case of Ames, his true motivation can be traced back to 
personality predisposition and his divergent loyalties; however, many continue to see his 
motivation as primarily financially motivated because of a fixation on the “symptoms” of his true 
motivation. 
Two primary critiques of the current actions taken by the government stem from this 
inability to accommodate conclusions beyond the research focusing on defection. The first 
critique lies in the understanding that research directed at motivation for defection reduces 
motivation to five categories, such as in MICE, and any new underlying motivational conditions 
will continue to fall under the established categories. The government, using the directed 
research as a guide to inform their defection prevention policies, is now unable to develop 
beyond existing policies because they see no change in what leads an individual to defect, 
leaving governmental policies unable to adjust to changing motivational trends, forcing them to 
maintain their current policies, which may or may not be the most effective option available.  
A second critique is an inability for the government to head off defection before it begins. 
This inability is systemic due to two primary factors. The first is that, the government, relying on 
the five categories to inform them of who is at risk of defecting, focuses their search on 
individuals exhibiting the factors outlined in the categories. This fixation allows those that have 
motivational ambitions to defect, not yet superficially evident, to continue to become 
increasingly more prone to defect. This is evident in the case of Aldrich Ames, where the 
argument can be made that, if Ames’ predisposition was head off earlier in his career cycle, he 
may have been either apprehended or prevented from defection in the first place. However, since 
the complexity of Ames’ case was outside the scope of the government’s understanding, his 
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deviant behavior progressed from mere theft to defection, due to aggravating factors, and 
continued, for nine years, until his superficial motivations came to the attention of the CIA. A 
second factor hindering the governments predictive ability, is a lack of theoretical structure 
proposed by those researching motivation for defection. Their failure leads to multiple 
observations, yet provides little insight into the way in which “financial motivations” interact 
with other components of an individual’s life to lead to defection.  
Therefore, the government, while unable to stop all defections, has taken actions to 
prevent and detect defection informed by research by establishing pre-employment procedures 
and programs during and post-employment to counter the conclusions drawn by research 
directed at motivation for defection within the intelligence community. However, this focus has 
left the government unable to understand the complexity of motivation for defection, and thus an 
individual’s true motivations, leaving the government fixated on preventing and detecting 
defection among those with superficial symptoms. In all, while the true extent of all defection 
will never be known, for a variety of reasons, the government has clearly taken actions to prevent 
defection, based upon their own understanding, yet, are left exposed due to their limited 
understanding of motivation for defection and a lack of theoretical framework from which to 
evaluate defection.  
 
The Pervasive and Inevitable Problems 
One key theme throughout the research presented has been the idea of uncertainty. 
Beginning with the uncertainty surrounding international relations, to the uncertainty of 
intelligence, leading to an understanding of uncertainty in determining an individual’s 
motivations. While this section also presents inescapable uncertainty, I also present four 
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omnipresent components that will always lead to difficulty when studying motivation for 
defection and implementing government policies directed at preventing or detecting defection 
within the intelligence community. 
The first aspect that must be addressed is the difficulty in understanding the true 
motivations of individuals working within the intelligence community. This difficulty emanates 
from a government’s desire to heavily invests in the formal and professional education and 
abilities of its officers to be able to outmaneuver other states’ intelligence agencies. Therefore, 
the problem in evaluating motivation for defection, and preventing and detecting defection, 
within the intelligence community is that you are working against officers that have been trained 
to be the best in deception and manipulation. Ultimately, in the act of defection within the 
intelligence community, the tools of deception and manipulation that have been honed to 
outmaneuver rivals is turned against the state, presenting the inescapable conundrum of the better 
a government makes their intelligence professionals, the more damage they can do themselves.  
The second component that must be understood is that, no matter how true the 
government’s understanding of motivation for defection or how perfect their policies of 
prevention and detection, to implement effective policies and actions to combat defection there 
needs to be intimate intergovernmental coordination. This difficulty is evident in the previous 
analyses of John Walker and Edward Howard, where, with more intergovernmental coordination, 
the effects of their defections could have been recognized sooner and the effects of their 
defection, mitigated. The pervasive nature of this component is that there will always be a finite 
amount of resources allocated from the U.S. government and the agencies will always be vying 
for as much of those resources, leading to a zero-sum game and encouraging them to do things 
“in house”. While interagency is still a point of contention, the U.S. government has taken active 
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steps to encourage increased cooperation through efforts, such as the creation of interagency task 
forces.227  
The third pervasive aspect that garners attention, is the fact that, even if the U.S. 
government truly understood motivation for defection perfectly and was able to implement it 
perfectly through interagency cooperation, those upholding the policies are human beings with 
the choice to either abide by the policies set forward or not. This observation stems from 
evidence supported by various cases, where, according to documented policy, an individual 
should have been reprimanded, penalized, or even fired, yet was not because their transgressions 
were overlooked.  
A final component to take into consideration when evaluating an individual’s motivation 
for defection prevention and detection, is that throughout every aspect of the process of creating 
and implementing policy and safeguards, human beings play an inescapable role. People are 
shaped by an infinite number of psychological and environmental factors that influence their 
decision-making. Throughout any given day they are presented with an absorbent amount of 
choices to make ranging from something as simple as whether they are going to brush their teeth 
to something as monumental as quitting a job. Therefore, throughout the process of attempting to 
evaluate an individual’s motivation for defection, there must be recognition of the abundance of 
factors that contribute to an individual’s motivation. However, it also effects whether an 
individual is willing to act on the policies designed to prevent and detect the defection of others 
in the community. Ultimately, the human “factor” that must be taken into account when 
evaluating motivation for defection within the intelligence community must also be considered 
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when developing and implementing policies to prevent and detect defection within the 
intelligence community, leading to a perpetual sense of uncertainty.  
 
A Way Forward 
 In response to my critiques of the way in which those studying motivation for defection 
have failed in assisting in the government’s ability to prevent and detect defection, I bring 
forward two proposals to address the previous shortcomings. My proposals seek to provide a 
way forward within the study of motivation for defection while also providing recommendations 
for increased governmental efforts aimed at preventing and detecting defection.  
The first proposal is in the need to develop the field of defection studies based on 
discovering the motivation for defection, not the situation that was leveraged to encouraged the 
individual to defect. The divergence of the two is that the “situation” can be described as the 
“last straw” or the most readily identifiable aspect that led to the defection, while the motivation 
is the true underlying causes of the defection, which may or may not coincide with the situation 
that led to the defection. A second recommendation is for the direct inclusion of academic work 
into defection studies. Much of the work focusing on defection stemmed either from practitioners 
within the intelligence community or from the government. I’m not implying that those focused 
on this topic are intentionally biased, but that there are inherent differences in an individual’s 
perspective on a situation, shaped by their life experiences, and that the foundation set forward 
by practitioners would be better suited if aided by the work of academics. A final 
recommendation for the study of motivation for defection within the intelligence community is 
to establish a framework from which they make their observations before attempting to draw 
conclusions. Developing and utilizing a theoretical framework effectively narrows down the 
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questions a field of study seeks to answer, 228 and its establishment would provide a standard way 
to evaluate previous and future cases of defection. In summation, before moving to make 
practical suggestions within the intelligence community, those evaluating motivation for 
defection within the intelligence community need to focus on establishing a theoretical basis 
aimed at determining an individual’s motivation for defection. This enhancement of the field of 
study as a whole will translate to enhanced practical capabilities, such as developing improved 
tools for intelligence officers and would prove more valuable for policy makers by identifying 
root motivational causes for defection.  
The second recommendation to better prevent and detect defection, in regards to 
government policy and procedures, is multipronged. The first aspect is the need for the 
government to have a more thorough understanding of motivation and the role it plays in an 
individual’s defection. To meet this requirement, those studying motivation for defection must 
make the necessary changes previously described. However, the research will only be able to be 
conducted if the government fulfills its obligation to supply the necessary funding towards, and 
prioritization of, establishing a better understanding of defection. A second recommendation for 
change is increased communication within the intelligence community. It was markedly noted, 
through the case studies that the intelligence agencies have increased cross-agency 
communication throughout the years. However, when information is time sensitive continued 
integration would only further benefit the efforts to prevent and detect defection. A third 
proposal is for the intelligence community to increase community integration. Current efforts by 
agencies include post-employment community building opportunities; however, efforts taken by 
the government to inform, and therefore more closely align, the larger public with the 
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intelligence community, would serve two purposes. The first would be that those coming on as 
an intelligence officer would already have a sense of identification with the intelligence 
community, allowing for a deeper ideological integration. While a second consideration would 
be the intelligence community’s reciprocation of a feeling of alignment with the community they 
are serving. A final proposal for actions to be taken, or continued, by the government to better 
prevent and detect defection, is the promotion of the values of the intelligence community. Many 
specific values include rule adherence, upholding one’s obligation, and instilling a sense of duty 
to one’s country. This effort would be two-pronged in its efforts to prevent defection. First, it 
would enhance social bonds, a proven factor to mitigate deviant behavior. A second benefit 
would be that the inherently unpredictability of whether an individual would uphold the 
standards and policies, would be decreased because of the communal pressures and obligations 
that one would have to uphold those duties and obligations.  
Throughout this chapter, I presented a critique, that those focusing on motivation for 
defection within the intelligence community oversimplified an explanation of motivation into 
five categories, which lead to a myriad of difficulties. The primary deficiency was in a lack of 
theoretical framework, which, in efforts to fully inform the government on motivation for 
defection, failed to determine an individual’s motivation for defection. This failure led to the 
U.S. government to lack an exhaustive understanding of the complexities of factors motivating 
defection. However, I also acknowledge that those studying motivation for defection, and the 
government, will have to continually confront a variety of pervasive factors stemming from an 
individual’s free will and unpredictable nature. I conclude by proposing various ways to rectify 
the deficiencies in defection studies while also proposing ways the government can move 
forward in their efforts to better prevent and detect defection within the intelligence community.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
One primary theme throughout international relations has been uncertainty. Many states 
have sought to mitigate this through the use of intelligence agencies. It is at this junction that my 
work begins. In identifying HUMINT as a critical component in rectifying these uncertainties, I 
sought to answer the question, does current research on motivation for defection adequately 
inform government procedures to prevent and detect defection within the intelligence 
community? In my efforts to answer this question, I address the role that motivation has in the 
intelligence community; how motivation has previously been discussed; and how individuals 
have applied motivational studies to defection. After establishing an understanding of what 
motivates an individual to defect, I applied these lessons to five case studies.  
The application of the previous research demonstrated a variety of reasons an individual 
would defect, including an individual’s predisposition to react negatively to a stressful situation, 
an inclination to engage in deviant behavior, or sub-threshold personality defects; divergent 
loyalties; discontent with the agency they were working for; and or financial incentives. 
However, in analyzing motivation for defection in the case studies demonstrated several 
deficiencies in the work of those focusing on motivation for defection within the intelligence 
community. Ultimately, this study demonstrated that their work focused not on motivation, but 
on how to leverage an individual’s predispositions and direct them towards defection. This 
fixation set off a series of irreconcilable deficiencies, with the primary one being a lack of 
established theoretical framework. This hindered the assessment of past cases, requiring the use 
of various theoretical applications to justify an assessment of what motivated an individual to 
defect.  
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The lack of a theoretical framework, in turn, has led to an incomplete understanding of 
what motivates an individual to defect. Therefore, I assess that current research on motivation for 
defection within the intelligence community does not adequately inform government policy and 
procedures to prevent and detect defection within the intelligence community.  
In light of this claim, I propose a two-pronged approach to move forward in better 
preventing and detecting defection within the intelligence community. The first component is for 
the government to increase inter-agency cooperation, in combination with bolstering funds for 
the programs that are already in place to deter individuals from defecting. The second component 
is for the government to allocate sufficient capital (financial and political) to those studying 
motivation for defection, to: 1) Shift their study from developing tools for intelligence officers, 
to studying motivation for defection and 2) Develop a theoretical framework from which to 
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